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We apply three complementary approaches designed to identify the localized effects of Superfund
site remediation under the CERCLA, examining data at the level of (i) the census tract (paying attention
to within tract heterogeneity), (ii) the census block, and (iii) individual house transaction.  Our analysis
of the within-tract housing value distribution detects statistically and economically significant appreciation
in the lower tails resulting from hazardous waste cleanup; deletion of a site raises tract-level housing
values by 18.2% at the 10th percentile, 15.4% at the median, and 11.4% at the 60th percentile.  These
tract results are confirmed by (i) house transaction data that show cheaper houses within each tract
are more likely to be exposed to waste sites within one kilometer, explaining their greater appreciation
from site cleanup, and (ii) high-resolution census block data that show greater appreciation among
blocks lying closer to the cleaned sites.  House-level repeat-sales data confirm results from our national
level census analysis by showing that deletion raises housing values relative to proposal in specific
markets, such as northern New Jersey, but they also uncover a great heterogeneity in the effects of
remediation across markets, with no statistical effects from deletion relative to proposal detected in
Los Angeles metro, southwestern Connecticut or Boston metro.
Shanti Gamper-Rabindran


















1      Introduction 
 
In the late 1970’s, events at Love Canal and the Valley of Drums raised public concern 
over the health and environmental risks associated with contaminated waste sites.  In response to 
these and other similar incidents, the US Congress established the Superfund program under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980.  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has since identified more than 47,000 hazardous 
waste sites potentially requiring cleanup actions and has placed some of the most seriously 
contaminated sites on its National Priorities List (NPL).  By the end of fiscal year 2007, EPA had 
classified 1,569 sites as NPL sites (GAO, 2008). 
While the costs of Superfund remediation can, in principle, be easily measured, the 
benefits of these activities are much more difficult to quantify.  In particular, there is no explicit 
market for the clean-up of hazardous waste.  Economists have therefore turned to a market where 
proximity to hazardous waste is an attribute of a marketed commodity – i.e., housing.
1  
Controlling for housing and neighborhood attributes, covariation of market price (or owner’s 
stated value) and exposure to Superfund sites at various stages of remediation can be used to 
measure the change in housing values associated with these cleanup activities.  In theory, 
Superfund cleanup can cause appreciation in house prices by reducing public perception of 
health or environmental hazards (Hamilton and Viscusi, 1999) and by spurring additional 
development projects.  However, a recent influential study that examines changes in census tract 
median housing values in response to listing on or deletion from the NPL concludes that 
Superfund cleanup (which costs an average of $40 million per site) fails to significantly raise 
nearby housing values (Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008).  Recognizing that resources are scarce 
and that government action in one area (e.g., Superfund) might preclude cleanup activities in 
another (e.g., water or air), an author of that study recommends a policy shift towards “reliance 
on less ambitious clean-ups like the erection of fences, posting of warning signs around the sites, 
and simple containment of toxics.”
2 
Our study separately re-evaluates the benefits from three different phases of the 
Superfund remediation process – proposal, listing, and deletion.  Importantly, it is the deletion 
stage that signals the end of the EPA’s cleanup process.  We use three different approaches that 
exploit variation in data at the level of (i) the census tract (paying particular attention to within-
tract heterogeneity), (ii) the census block, and (iii) the individual housing transaction.  These 
approaches are designed to identify localized effects of Superfund cleanup that may not be 
detectable using census tract median housing values.  Our census tract approach, using public 
data, is able to discern separate effects at the lower percentiles of the housing value distribution 
within each tract.  This is important, because census tracts can be large, and Superfund sites are 
                                                            
1 Our study is narrowly limited to benefits discernible from the hedonic property value models and is, hence, 
conservative in its conclusions.  Many benefits are outside the scope of our study (e.g., certain types of ecosystem 
benefits). These benefits are discussed in a 2006 review by the Scientific Advisory Body (2006). 
2 Hirsch (2008) downloaded from http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2008/superfund-0805.html 5 
 
not likely to be randomly distributed within them.  If sites tend to be situated in low-value 
neighborhoods, cleanup activities may only result in appreciation for cheaper homes.  The 
impacts of cleanup may, therefore, be imperceptible in the tract’s median value, and hard to 
discern even at the mean.  Our census block analysis, using restricted-access data, directly 
addresses the problem of localized externalities by going inside the census tract and examining 
median housing values at a very fine level of geographic precision.
3  Our repeat-sales analysis, 
using proprietary data from Dataquick Information Services, measures the effects of Superfund 
cleanup activities at an even finer level of geographic and temporal precision, and makes use of 
actual transaction prices instead of owners’ stated values.  
To identify the effect of site status on housing values in the tract and block analyses, we 
compare changes in values between 1990 and 2000 to changes in exposure to (i) sites that are 
deleted from the NPL, (ii) sites that were listed but not deleted, and (iii) sites that were proposed 
but not listed.  Our identification strategy relies both on our model and our sample restrictions. 
First, our panel analysis, which is based on the standard hedonic model, helps identify the effect 
of site status on housing values.  By taking a first-difference between 2000 and 1990 data, we 
control for time invariant unobservables that are correlated with site status.  Second, we restrict 
our analysis to neighborhoods that (i) lie within 3km buffers of NPL sites that received a 
hazardous ranking score (HRS) in 1982 within a narrow interval,
4 and (ii) do not lie near other 
post-1982 NPL sites.  The first sample restriction, proposed in Greenstone and Gallagher (2008), 
can isolate the effect of site status because treatment (i.e., listing on the NPL) is discrete for sites 
that exceed an exogenous HRS cutoff, while unobservables are likely to be continuous across 
that regulatory threshold in that sample.  The second sample restriction strengthens the first so as 
to avoid the confounding effects from cleanup activities at other nearby NPL sites.  The 
empirical strategy for our third approach uses house-level repeat-sales data to control for both 
time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity at the level of the house and time-varying 
unobservable heterogeneity at the level of the census tract.  
Our results at these three levels of analysis reveal that deletion, which signals the end of 
cleanup activities, significantly raises the value of nearby owner-occupied houses on average at 
the national-level, but that there is considerable heterogeneity in this effect across metro-specific 
housing markets. Our tract analysis finds that deletion of a site raises housing values 
significantly at the lower deciles of the within-tract housing value distribution – by 18.2% at the 
10th percentile, 15.4% at the median, and 11.4% at the 60th percentile.  Greater appreciation of 
housing values at the lower percentiles is compatible with NPL sites being in close proximity to 
lower value houses within a tract.  We confirm this spatial pattern in three of four housing 
markets with transactions data describing individual houses. Results at the block level are 
                                                            
3 Census tracts are often significantly larger than census blocks.  There are as many as 350 census blocks in some 
census tracts. 
4 For the sake of comparison with previous work that has used larger distances, we also check the sensitivity of our 
results to 5km buffers. 6 
 
compatible with the tract level, showing that the deletion of sites raises nearby housing prices by 
19.0% and 5.8% for blocks lying < 1km and < 3km from the site. 
Our analysis of repeat-sales data uncovers evidence of significant heterogeneity in the 
effects of Superfund site remediation across metro areas. We find that deletion (measured 
relative to proposal) causes a sizable appreciation in housing values in northern New Jersey 
(11.3%), but we find no statistically significant effect of deletion (measured relative to 
proposal) for LA metro, southwestern Connecticut or metro Boston. While the appreciation 
in New Jersey indicates that some neighborhoods do recover post-cleanup,  the lower prices in 
Boston at deletion relative to pre-discovery (-6.1%) suggest, conversely, that stigma against 
contaminated sites and neighborhoods can also persist despite cleanup.  
 
What can be learned from this study? 
Typically, researchers are only able to access publicly available census tract data.  
Recognizing this fact, we demonstrate that our method, which accounts for within tract 
heterogeneity, can detect benefits from cleanup that may be understated or missed by studies that 
focus on median tract-level housing values.  We then use block data to directly verify that our 
tract results are not mere artifacts of our method.  Indeed, our estimates at the tract and block-
levels are similar – the 18.2%
 appreciation at the 10
th percentile of the within tract housing 
values is comparable to the 19.0% for blocks lying within 1km.  Moreover, we use house-level 
transaction data to verify the story underlying our quantile approach in three out of four markets 
– i.e., that it is the cheaper houses within each tract which are more likely to be exposed to NPL 
sites.  These results suggest that our quantile approach provides a practical method for estimating 
the impact of localized externalities, even without access to proprietary or restricted access data. 
Nevertheless, our proposed method has its limits. Not all localized benefits detectable 
with finer resolution block- and house-level data may be found by an analysis of the tract-level 
housing price distribution.  However, given the reality that many hedonic studies are forced rely 
on tract-level data (Hanna, 2007; Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008; Grainger, 2010), the 
advantages of which include accessibility and nationwide coverage, our extension avoids an 
important source of bias that results from a narrow focus on the mean or median tract-level 
housing values.  
We draw two conclusions from our results that are directly relevant for evaluating the 
Superfund remediation program. First, the average effect of Superfund site remediation on 
housing values across all markets is positive and significant.  Moreover, we note that benefits 
measured by appreciation in housing values provide only part of the overall benefits from 
Superfund cleanup.  Importantly, these results speak to the aggregate benefit of the Superfund 
program, which could be compared with program costs in an efficiency analysis.  It also provides 
the strongest available information with which to perform a cost-benefit analysis of a particular 7 
 
candidate site, in the absence of estimates from specific-metro areas or site-specific information.  
Second, while Superfund remediation raises housing values on average at the national-level, 
there is considerable variation in that effect across housing markets. This heterogeneity suggests 
that to perform a cost-benefit analysis of a particular candidate site, metro-specific estimates, 




The remainder of this study proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the main milestones 
of the Superfund remediation process and provides a brief review of the literature.  Section 3 
describes our three alternative strategies for identifying the impacts of site remediation based on 
tract-level, block-level, and house-level data.  Section 4 describes the empirical specifications 
used in each of these approaches.  Section 5 discusses our data sets and Section 6 reports the 
results of our analyses.  Section 7 concludes and discusses some possible extensions to our work. 
Appendices A1 and A2 provide details on the construction of variables. Appendix A3 provides a 
comparison of our study with Greenstone and Gallagher (2008). 
 
2  Benefits from Superfund cleanup 
2.1   Superfund Milestones 
Our analyses focus on the three major milestones in the National Priorities List (NPL) 
process, in which the EPA publicizes information about the site to members of the public by 
entering information into the Federal Register and soliciting public comment.  These three stages 
are (i) proposal to, (ii) listing on, and (iii) deletion from the NPL.  To measure the benefits from 
Superfund site cleanup, we focus on deletion from the NPL, which signals that cleanup is 
completed and no further response is required to protect human health or the environment.  
While “construction complete” (a designation given to sites prior to deletion) has been often used 
by EPA since 1990 as an indicator of successful remediation, we chose instead to use deletion 
for this purpose.
5  There are three reasons for this choice – (i) the construction complete 
designation may be applied before final cleanup levels have been achieved, (ii) the deletion 
designation is accompanied by a public announcement in the Federal Register and a major 
newspaper, and (iii) relying on deletion instead of construction complete is a conservative 
                                                            
5 See Probst and Sherman (2004) for a discussion of the construction complete designation.  The use of construction 
complete instead of deletion acknowledges an important reality of many Superfund sites – namely, that sites may 
not actually be fully cleaned-up for decades following the completion of construction work associated with 
remediation activities.  This may be particularly true, for example, when groundwater has been contaminated.  In 
these cases, construction complete is a very important milestone from a policy-making perspective. 8 
 
strategy for valuing the benefits of cleanup.
6  In our census analyses, we recover values for each 
of these three stages of the remediation process, but do not include “discovery” as it is not 
identified under most of the sample cuts we use with census data.  In our house-level analyses, 
however, we are able to include the discovery designation as we do not need to rely on these 
sample cuts for identification.  Below, we describe these (and other) major milestones in detail. 
 
Discovery, Preliminary Assessment, and Site Investigation 
A site is discovered when the EPA becomes aware of it from the general public or from 
local and state environmental agencies.  The EPA then conducts a preliminary assessment, which 
is designed to distinguish, based on limited data, between sites that pose little or no threat to 
human health and the environment and sites that may pose a threat and require further 
investigation.  If the preliminary assessment results in a recommendation for further 
investigation, a site inspection is performed.  Investigators collect environmental and waste 
samples to determine what hazardous substances are present at a site, whether these substances 
are being released into the environment, and if so, whether they have reached nearby targets.  
Information collected during the preliminary assessment and site inspection is used to calculate a 
Hazard Ranking System (HRS) score.
7  
 
Proposal and Listing on the NPL 
Based on the preliminary assessment and site inspection, the EPA proposes a site to the 
NPL in the Federal Register.  The EPA then accepts public comments on the sites for 60 days 
and responds to public comments.  The EPA will list the site on the NPL if it meets at least one 
of three criteria – (i) the HRS score is of sufficient magnitude, (ii) the state environmental 
authority designates the site to be a top priority, or (iii) the US Public Health Service 
recommends removing all people in close proximity to the site. 
 
Cleanup Process 
After the site achieves listing status on the NPL, the cleanup process commences in a 
series of steps.  The remedial investigation collects data to characterize site conditions, assess 
risks to human health and the environment, and evaluate the potential performance and cost of 
                                                            
6 In particular, if some of the benefits of cleanup are actually captured by construction complete but we lump that 
designation in with listing, it will make it more difficult to find evidence of benefits associated with moving a site 
from listing to deletion. 
7 The HRS score serves as a numerically based screening device that uses information from initial, limited 
investigations.  Sites with an HRS score of 28.5 or greater are eligible for listing on the NPL and require the 
preparation of an HRS scoring package.  The story behind the 28.5 cutoff is described in detail below. 9 
 
alternative treatment technologies.  The feasibility screening process develops and evaluates 
alternative remedial actions.  The EPA publishes the Record of Decision (ROD), a public 
document that explains cleanup alternatives, and makes this document available to the public 
through the EPA online ROD system.
8  The technical specifications for cleanup remedies and 
technologies are designed in the remedial design phase.  The actual cleanup operations are 
implemented in the remedial action phase.  
 
Deletion from the NPL  
Deletion of a site from the NPL requires that the necessary actions for remediation have 
been completed and the site no longer poses a threat to human health.  Prior to deletion, the EPA 
posts plans to delete the site in a local newspaper and solicits public comment.  Once deletion is 
deemed appropriate, the EPA will enter notification of deletion in the Federal Register. 
 
2.2  Superfund Cleanup and Housing Market Effects 
At least three Superfund milestones – proposal, listing, and deletion – can influence 
neighborhood housing prices.  Proposal of a site to the NPL may reduce neighborhood housing 
prices when this action provides new information to the housing market that contamination is 
severe enough to warrant the potential listing of that site on the NPL (although, if the housing 
market expects that proposal signals that the site is likely to be remediated, this countervailing 
factor will dampen the extent of that depreciation).  Housing prices have been found to decline 
due to perceived health risks from a nearby site (Hamilton and Viscusi, 1999)
9 and from the 
stigma associated with that contaminated site.
10  Listing of a site on the NPL is associated with 
two countervailing forces; (i) it may reduce housing prices by confirming the severe nature 
contamination of that site, but (ii) it may also increase housing prices by signaling that the site 
will be remediated. 
                                                            
8 A ROD contains site history, site description, site characteristics, community participation, enforcement activities, 
past and present activities, contaminated media, the contaminants present, scope and role of response action and the 
remedy selected for cleanup. 
9 Davis (2004) finds that information on health risks are capitalized into housing values.  In particular, the 
emergence of a cancer cluster of pediatric leukemia resulted in the depreciation in housing values in a Nevada 
county relative to a nearby county. 
10 Stigma (Fischoff, 2001) can indirectly drive down housing prices even if well-informed buyers, who do not object 
in principle to buying the houses in question, are willing to pay less because they expect future stigmatization to 
reduce future demand for these houses.  Messer et al (2006) describe “when residents or potential buyers are 
extraordinarily fearful of a site, they may respond by shunning the site.… If risks are perceived as being excessive, 
people replace calculations of risk versus benefit with a simple heuristic of shunning, the avoidance of the 
stigmatized object.” 10 
 
Deletion from the NPL, which is the focus of our study, can increase housing prices 
through two channels.  First, cleanup directly reduces the health risks and disamenities from a 
site.    Second, cleanup may prompt further development in the area surrounding the site, 
including the potential for re-zoning from a lower-value commercial use to higher-value luxury 
development. Because cleanup does increase the likelihood that these development projects are 
undertaken, we attribute housing price appreciation via this indirect channel to the cleanup 
operations. 
As long as the development occurs conditional on cleanup being undertaken, our study 
correctly attributes the benefits from that development as a component of the benefit from 
Superfund cleanup.  For example, the Empire Canyon Daly West Mine Superfund site in Utah 
underwent extensive remediation under the Superfund program.  After the remediation, the 
landowners leased that site for the development of a luxury resort, including a hotel, spa and 
condominium project (EPA, 2008).  Such an outcome does not present a problem for our 
analysis, but rather represents the sort of mechanism through which remediation is translated into 
higher housing prices.  An estimation problem would only arise if the causality went in the other 
direction – e.g., landowners decide to build a luxury resort (which was going to raise nearby 
housing prices regardless of EPA actions), and the EPA responds by moving the site through the 
process to deletion. Our literature review has not uncovered evidence of such actions by the 
EPA. 
 
2.3  Benefits from Superfund Cleanup 
  The appreciation of housing values is one dimension of the potential benefits from Superfund 
cleanup.  In particular, the appreciation of housing values will reflect the perceived reduction in 
risk among homebuyers.
11  Other potential benefits may not be accounted for by the local 
homebuyers, such as downstream ecological benefits.  To the extent that buyers do not fully 
incorporate the reduction in risks in their valuation, the measured appreciation is a lower-bound 
estimate.
12  Other potential benefits include reduced health risks that are typically measured by 
the value of a statistical life. 
                                                            
11 Gayer et al (2000) find that residents around seven NPL and non-NPL sites in Grand Rapids Michigan update 
their perception of risks when the EPA released their assessment of the sites.  They find that consumers’ perceptions 
of cancer risks are overestimated before the EPA releases a detailed estimate of the risks; those consumers therefore 
pay a much higher premium for houses further from the site before the release of the report.  They find that even at 
the inflated perceived risk levels, the upper-bound for the willingness to pay for the six sites in the area to be cleaned 
is about one-sixth of the remediation cost.  However, one criticism of this study is its focus on one health outcome 
alone (i.e., cancer understates the overall health risks). 
12 The appreciation of housing values will reflect the perceived reduction in risk and stigma among homebuyers. 
Therefore, any reduction in risks that are not factored into the perceived risks, due to incomplete information or 
individuals’ erroneous assessment of risks, will not be capitalized in housing values.  11 
 
Our tract and block analyses estimate the average appreciation in housing prices across 
sites, though the rate of appreciation is likely to differ across sites.  Variation in appreciation in 
housing values may arise from the final use of the sites, the neighborhood attributes, and the 
extent of cleanup (see Section 6.2, “Estimation Issue #2: Variation in extent of remediation” for 
details).  Cleanup in areas with high demand for housing or potential for development may lead 
to greater appreciation in housing values than cleanup in sites that are surrounded by other 
disamenities such as high crime rates and brownfields.
13  
 
2.4   Previous Studies  
    The large literature that seeks to measure the value of Superfund site remediation has 
been exhaustively reviewed in Schultze et al (1995), Kiel and Williams (2007), Sigman (2008) 
and EPA (2009).
14  First, we briefly describe the hedonic approach that examines median 
housing values in locations that vary in the number or status of sites contained within.  We then 
provide a short summary of papers that use a second approach that considers a single site and 
determines how proximity to it impacts the selling price of nearby homes.  That effect is 
measured with a distance gradient that typically varies with site status. 
 
Hedonic Approach #1:  Comparison of housing values across neighborhoods 
    Greenberg and Hughes (1992) study seventy-seven communities in New Jersey and find 
that sale prices of houses in Superfund communities appreciate by less than those in non-
Superfund communities.  Noonan et al (2007) study the effect of Superfund remediation 
activities on housing values measured at the block-group level using a national sample.  Like our 
analysis, they use fixed effects to control for time-invariant neighborhood unobservables.  Unlike 
our analysis, they compare those block groups that are close to waste sites with other block 
groups across contiguous US.  
    We build most directly upon Greenstone and Gallagher (2008), who examine how tract 
median housing prices vary depending upon whether they contain a site that has been listed on 
the NPL or one that has been proposed but not listed.  Their study makes two important 
methodological contributions.  First, they argue that studies examining the impact of Superfund 
cleanup should restrict their comparisons to only those neighborhoods that host NPL sites – in 
other words, the approach taken in Greenberg and Hughes (1992) and Noonan et al (2007) may 
                                                            
13 The Gowanus Canal in Brooklyn, which was listed on the NPL in 2010, is an example of an area of high 
residential demand and development potential.  In February 2009, the city of New York granted a rezoning request 
for residential housing along the waterway (Navarro, 2010).  Conversely, high crime and brownfields may limit the 
housing price appreciation from cleanup at some sites.  Nevertheless, equity considerations may still play a part in 
the decision to support their cleanup.   
14 In particular, see Table 4 in Schultze et al (1995) and Tables 1 and 2 in EPA (2009). 12 
 
lead to biased estimates.  In particular, Greenstone and Gallagher argue that the comparison of 
neighborhoods that host NPL sites (in the proposed or deleted phase) with those that do not will 
yield biased estimates because unobservables will differ systematically across these two types of 
neighborhoods.
15 
    Second, to control for unobservables that may be correlated with listing, Greenstone and 
Gallagher apply a regression discontinuity (RD) design that draws on the early institutional 
history of the NPL.  In the first year of Superfund legislation, the EPA’s assessment process 
identified 687 of the most dangerous sites.  Budget constraints forced the EPA to choose only 
400 sites to list on the NPL, and the EPA employed the HRS ranking to choose those sites that 
posed the greatest risks.  In the HRS ranking of these sites, it turned out that an HRS score of 
28.5 served as the cutoff between the 400
th treated and 401
st untreated site.  Greenstone and 
Gallagher’s RD analysis examines 227 sites with HRS scores that were 12 points above or below 
the 28.5 regulatory cutoff, thus exploiting the dichotomous treatment at the regulatory cutoff, 
while assuming that the unobservables were continuous across that cutoff.
16 
    There are four aspects of Greenstone and Gallagher’s analysis that suggest a downward 
bias in their estimates of the benefits from Superfund cleanup (Smith, 2006).  First, to measure 
the effect of Superfund cleanup on housing values, Greenstone and Gallagher examine the effect 
of a variable that conflates two distinct milestones in the Superfund process – listing and 
deletion.
17  Conflation of these treatments is required in order for them to be able to implement 
their instrumental variable strategy.  Specifically, Greenstone and Gallagher use the 1982 HRS 
score to instrument for the variable indicating that a site has been listed on (or deleted from) the 
NPL by 2000; that one variable cannot separately instrument for the two milestones of listing 
and deletion.  However, one might worry that conflation of listing and deletion will bias 
downward the estimated benefits from cleanup.  In particular, listing has ambiguous overall 
effects on housing prices, while deletion is likely to raise housing prices.  In contrast, our study 
measures the value of cleanup by examining the effect of deletion from the NPL on housing 
                                                            
15 Table II in Greenstone and Gallagher shows that these two sets of tracts differ significantly in their observables 
and by extension, are likely to differ in their unobservables. 
16 Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) note that the use of the regulatory cutoff at HRS equal to 28.5 is a good 
empirical strategy for at least three reasons.  First, the HRS scores assigned to the 1982 sample were established 
before the 28.5 threshold was set.  It is unlikely that scores were manipulated to obtain Superfund treatment, 
particularly in the narrow range just above or below the cutoff.  Second, the HRS score is a noisy measure of risk, 
and thus, the true risk is likely to be similar around the 28.5 cutoff.  Third, there was no evidence that the sites below 
28.5 were “safe.” 
17 While their primary analysis deals with the values placed on owned housing, Greenstone and Gallagher also 
examine the sensitivity of rental rates to Superfund site remediation.  When looking at rental rates, they do separate 
the effects of different Superfund milestones – (1) on the NPL but a ROD has not been issued, (2) a ROD and/or 
cleanup has been initiated but not completed, and (3) construction complete or deleted from the NPL.  They report 
that the separate milestones do not influence rental rates.  Our study focuses on owned housing and three Superfund 
milestones - proposal,  listing, and deletion, because EPA publication in the Federal Register and solicitation of 
public comment at these milestones can provide information to the housing market resulting in the capitalization of 
that information into housing values. 13 
 
prices; this effect is measured separately from that of NPL listing.
18  As we separately measure 
listing and deletion, the 1982 HRS score instrumental variable (IV) strategy cannot be used in 
our study.  
Second, to measure the effect of cleanup, we would ideally compare tracts exposed to 
sites that are cleaned up to the counterfactual that those sites were not cleaned up.  To serve as 
the counterfactual (i.e., the “non-treatment” baseline), Greenstone and Gallagher use tracts 
exposed to both sites proposed to NPL (but not listed) and sites that were never proposed to the 
NPL (i.e., non-NPL sites).  However, tracts that host non-NPL sites may have systematically 
different unobserved attributes compared with tracts that host NPL sites.  If non-NPL sites are 
associated with “better” unobservables than sites proposed to (but not listed on) the NPL, this 
would create an elevated baseline of housing values against which the benefit of treatment is 
measured (thus biasing downward the estimated benefit from treatment).  In contrast, our study 
uses only tracts exposed to NPL sites in their pre-proposed stage as the “non-treatment” baseline; 
these sites are more likely to be similar to the NPL sites that have progressed to deletion.  
Appendix A3 describes in detail the differences in the construction of our data set and 
Greenstone and Gallagher’s data set. 
Third, in defining the neighborhood over which the cleanup exerts a localized effect, 
Greenstone and Gallagher consider attributes of tracts falling within buffers of three and five 
miles around sites.
19  However, panel data studies of the association between hazardous waste 
sites and housing prices have detected effects at a maximum distance of 2 to 2.5 miles ( 3.2 to 
4km) with a mean estimated price effect of 7.4% (reviewed in Jenkins et al, 2006).  Greenstone 
and Gallagher’s larger neighborhood definition may therefore encompass both houses that are 
affected and unaffected by the effect of cleanup, which will dilute the estimated benefits of that 
treatment.  In contrast, we define the affected neighborhood using smaller buffers of 3 km (2 
miles) around the sites and test the sensitivity of our results to larger buffers of 5km (3 miles). 
Fourth, Greenstone and Gallagher’s focus on the median housing value at the census tract 
level may miss or understate the benefits from Superfund cleanup if such benefits are localized.  
Given the fairly large size of many census tracts, we suspect that there may be significant within-
tract heterogeneity in housing values.  In particular, we demonstrate that, within a tract, cheaper 
houses are more likely to be located in closer proximity to sites, and that the cleanup of sites will 
have a greater impact on the values of these subsets of houses.  Therefore, to capture the impact 
on these subsets of houses within the tract, we use two approaches.  First, we examine the deciles 
of the tract-level housing value distribution, not simply the median.  Second, we examine 
housing values at the level of the census block, which is a higher-resolution geographical unit 
than the census tract, and therefore less prone to problem of within-unit heterogeneity. 
                                                            
18 Other studies have measured the distinct effects of these various milestones (Kiel and Zabel, 2001; Cameron and 
McConnaha, 2006; Kiel and Williams, 2007) and treated these milestones as distinct (Sigman, 2001).   
19 Greenstone and Gallagher’s choice of three miles is based on the EPA’s use of that distance in their HRS 
calculations, as in most cases, contaminants can migrant to at least this distance (Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008). 14 
 
    Appendix A3 provides the most direct comparison possible of our methodological 
approach and that used by Greenstone and Gallagher (2008).  First, we construct an “intersection 
sample” (i.e., the intersection of our two data sets).  Using that sample we then recover results 
similar to Greenstone and Gallagher using their methodology.  Finally, we show how those 
results change (in particular, how significant effects of NPL deletion are realized) when we (i) 
separately control for the listing and deletion site statuses, (ii) exploit panel variation to control 
for time-invariant unobservable tract attributes, and (iii) look at points on the within-tract 
housing value distribution besides the median. 
 
Hedonic Approach #2: Distance from the disamenity  
    The second approach is to take a known site, determine how distance from it impacts the 
selling price of nearby homes, and determine how that distance gradient varies with site status.  
This approach requires individual transaction data for each house sold in a given period and uses 
hedonic pricing theory stemming from Rosen (1974), with distance from a site serving as the 
main housing characteristic of interest.  Papers employing the single-site “distance approach” 
primarily rely on cross-sectional variation in house prices.
20  Kiel and Zabel (2001) focus on the 
two Superfund sites in Woburn, MA.  They are interested in the premium paid for distance to the 
nearest site but do not allow multiple sites to enter into the hedonic price function.  While they 
do not employ panel data, they do estimate the price function at several points in time.  Kiel and 
Williams (2007) similarly estimate separate hedonic price functions based on distance to the 
closest site, repeating the process for each of 74 NPL sites spread across 13 US counties.  They 
find significant evidence of heterogeneity in the effect of Superfund remediation activities. 
    The primary strength of the distance-based studies is that they allow for a great deal of 
heterogeneity in calculating the benefits associated with site remediation.  In particular, these 
single-site analyses can recover a different set of estimates pertaining to the homes surrounding 
each site.  This flexibility, however, comes at a cost.  First, sites do not exist in isolation – a 
significant fraction of NPL sites are located in close proximity to other NPL sites, creating the 
potential for important omitted variable bias.
21  There may be other location-specific 
unobservables (besides NPL sites) that will also bias the estimated impact of the NPL site in 
question.  For example, there is the potential for correlation between the location of hazardous 
waste and economic opportunity to confound the disamenities of living near a site with the 
relative appeal of living near what could be an employment center (Farber, 1998).  Similarly, if 
there is correlation between remediation decisions and unobserved neighborhood quality, 
                                                            
20 A second subset of papers employing the “distance approach” use information in repeat sales of individual houses 
to control non-parametrically for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the house level (Miller, 1982; Case et 
al., 2006).   
21 37.7% of NPL sites in our data have another site within 4.59 km, which is the mean distance to a site in Kiel and 
Williams (2007) plus two standard deviations. 15 
 
estimates of the effect of hazardous waste cleanup could be upwardly biased.  To the extent that 
these unobservables do not vary over time, panel data distance analyses will be able to control 
for them. 
    A second potential problem arises in terms of how one should use these heterogeneous 
marginal effects generated from a single-site distance analysis for policy.  In particular, given a 
newly proposed candidate site, it is not clear which of the many estimated heterogeneous 
marginal effects one should apply to it.  When single-site distance analyses are performed 
separately on each of a number of sites (as in Kiel and Williams (2007)), the average effect that 
one recovers is based on the characteristics of the sites that happened to be chosen, which may 
not be representative of all sites.  There is no reason to expect that this average would apply to all 
sites in the program in general.  With access to detailed site attribute data, one could match a new 
candidate site to a previously valued site based on these attributes.  However, with that sort of 
data, we could allow for explicitly heterogeneous marginal effects in our multi-site analysis as 
well.  
    Do the methods described in the previous sub-section solve these problems?  Not 
necessarily.  In particular, estimates from national analyses may not be accurate measures of the 
hedonic price schedule in a particular region, since there is no reason to expect preferences for 
environmental quality to be constant across the nation.  There is, however, a trade-off – site-
specific analyses uncover idiosyncratic price gradients for specific sites in specific places, but 
these estimates cannot be generalized to different sites in different locations.  A more valuable 
resource would be a set of estimates that are generalizable across many sites in a particular 
region – i.e., a regional or city-level analysis that accounts for the idiosyncratic preferences of 
the area while averaging over all hazardous waste sites the region.  Imposing homogeneity on 
hazardous waste sites in a region is a more palatable assumption than imposing homogeneity 
over sites in a country, and the resultant estimates should be more applicable within the region 
than estimates from the national sample. 
    These concerns motivate our use of housing transactions data later in the paper.  
Specifically, to uncover the regional implicit price for environmental quality as it relates to 
Superfund sites, it is necessary to use the regional housing market, not simply housing 
transactions in a radius around a site.  However, a natural consequence of incorporating all sites 
in a region is the potential for houses to be located near multiple sites.  This problem is 
exacerbated in regions where Superfund sites are clustered spatially.  To address this problem, 
we adopt an approach that incorporates all sites in a particular region into the analysis and treats 
them homogeneously; the results should be interpreted as price effects from the “average site” in 
the metropolitan area or region.  That effect will differ, however, across regions. 
    We would suggest that there is value in both multi-site, cross-neighborhood analyses and 
single-site, distance-based analyses.  Single-site analyses are particularly useful for recovering a 
distribution of heterogeneous marginal effects, but may be prone to bias associated with 16 
 
unobserved neighborhood attributes.  A national model (like the one we estimate here) sacrifices 
heterogeneity but does control for omitted variables better in deriving an unbiased estimate of 
average program effects.  
 
3   Estimation Method 
3.1  Geographical Resolution: Tracts, Blocks and Houses  
We conduct our study at three different levels of geographic resolution – census tracts,  
census blocks, and individual houses.  A summary of the strengths and weaknesses of each of 
these three approaches, along with the ways in which they complement one another, is presented 
in Table 1.  
In our census tract analysis, we look for evidence that Superfund remediation, which we 
expect to have highly localized effects, has greater impact at the lower percentiles of within-tract 
house value distributions.  The Decennial Census provides counts of houses with owners’ stated 
values in various intervals, allowing us to calculate the discrete distribution of house values 
within each tract.  These intervals are described in Appendix Table A1.  We use straight lines to 
connect the midpoints of these intervals portrayed in a cumulative distribution function 
histogram; we then read the cumulative distribution function of house values in each census tract 
from those lines.  Percentiles read off of these distribution functions are then used as dependent 
variables in our empirical analysis. 
We expect Superfund remediation to have greater influence on house values in the lower 
percentiles of the within-tract house value distribution if Superfund sites lie closer to the lower 
value houses within each tract; we document, using proprietary housing transactions data, that 
this is indeed the within-tract spatial distribution for three out of four housing markets.  The tract 
analysis takes snapshots of the NPL status in 1990 and 2000, and relates changes in percentiles 
of the housing value distribution to changes in the status of the nearby NPL sites between 1990 
and 2000. 
We also use restricted-access census block data to measure appreciation in house values 
when these effects are highly localized.  The block data directly improve upon the tract analysis, 
as the coarse geographical resolution that accompanies census tracts may obscure potential 
benefits from site cleanup.
22  Like the tract analyses, the block analysis takes snapshots of the 
NPL status in 1990 and 2000, and relates changes in housing values to changes in the status of 
the nearby NPL sites between 1990 and 2000. 
                                                            
22 The main advantage of the tract analysis is that it can be conducted with publicly available data.  Use of the block 
data requires special sworn status and project approval from the Census Bureau. 17 
 
Finally, repeat-sales data from Dataquick Information Services provide detailed 
information for every housing transaction (i.e., sales prices, date of sale, housing characteristics, 
and geographic coordinates) in a variety of metropolitan statistical areas (MSA’s).  Pairing this 
with information about every Superfund site in each of these MSA’s (and its status at each point 
in time) allows for valuation of each stage of the remediation process.  There are many 
advantages of this approach over the tract and block analyses described above.  (i) These data 
provide even finer spatial and temporal resolution than do the restricted-access decennial census 
block data.  (ii) By using actual transaction prices, we overcome the problems of misreported or 
biased self-reported stated values in tract and block census data.
23  (iii) Working with one MSA 
at a time, we are able to detect heterogeneity in the welfare effects of remediation across cities.  
(iv) Considering one MSA at a time also allows us to use a more realistic definition of the 
housing market confronting potential home buyers (i.e., a single MSA as opposed to the entire 
county).  (v) By tracking the same house across multiple transactions, we are able to account for 
house fixed effects in a way that is not possible using repeated cross-sectional census data.  The 
main disadvantages encountered with repeat-sales data is that the sample of houses actually 
taken to market more than once in the sample period may not be a random sample of the 
underlying population of all houses, and that the sample of sites considered may not be 
nationally representative.  However, as seen in Table 5, the set of houses in our data that sell 
multiple times are similar in terms of prices to houses that sell only once.  It is also possible that 
the house fixed effect assumption (i.e., that unobserved house attributes do not change over time) 
may be violated, although we make sample cuts (described below) in an effort to avoid this 
problem. 
 
3.2   Identification Strategy: Tract and Block Analysis 
In our baseline specification, we examine tracts that lie in 3km buffers surrounding NPL 
sites.  Taking a conservative approach, a tract is included in a buffer if any part of it is found 
using GIS software to intersect with the 3km buffer.
24  The tract and block analyses take 
snapshots of the NPL status of each tract in 1990 and 2000 and relate changes in percentiles of 
the housing value distribution to changes in those site statuses.  We compare changes in owner-
occupied housing values between 1990 and 2000 to changes in exposure to (i) sites that are 
                                                            
23 Kiel and Zabel (1999) compare owner assessments and actual sale prices for three metropolitan areas over eleven 
years.  They find that, although owners generally overestimate their values by 5%, the differences in these two 
values are not related to housing or owner characteristics other than tenure in the house.  DiPasquale and Somerville  
(1995) find that price series based on transaction prices and owner-reported values have very similar time-series 
patterns, although they can differ near market turning points.  They also report that owner estimates of value are 
consistently higher than reported transaction prices. 
24 The disadvantage of this approach is that an entire tract can be quite large.  An alternative approach would be to 
examine only sub-segments of tracts that fall within the 3km buffer.  However, doing so would necessitate an 
assumption that each tract is internally spatially homogeneous, which we show to be untrue. 18 
 
proposed for the NPL but not listed, (ii) sites that are listed on the NPL but not deleted, and (iii) 
sites that are deleted from the NPL.  Our tract and block analyses rely on two complementary 
identification strategies: sample restrictions and modeling strategy.   
 
Sample restrictions 
We delineate three samples of neighborhoods for comparison; the third is our strictest 
and most preferred.  First, in our “all-NPL” sample, we examine tracts that contain land inside 
the buffers surrounding 1,722 sites that have been proposed to the NPL (before Jan 1, 2010); 
many of these sites subsequently went on to further stages of remediation.  Our assumption is 
that the set of tracts in buffers surrounding sites are likely to be more similar to one another than 
the set of all tracts in the country.  The main difference among the tracts in our all-NPL sample is 
with respect to their receipt of treatment – i.e., some of the sites in these neighborhoods were 
listed on the NPL, and some of those sites were subsequently deleted from the NPL.  
In our second sample, we build upon the Greenstone and Gallagher regression 
discontinuity (RD) research design.  In our RD sample, we examine neighborhoods that host a 
subset of the ever-proposed NPL sites (i.e., those that were scored in 1982 and whose scores lie 
between 16.5 and 40.5).  Our RD sample comprises 1,454 tracts surrounding 212 sites.  While 
the RD design aims to address the unobservables correlated with listing, we expect that the 
balancing of unobservables across both sides of the treatment discontinuity may help control for 
unobservables that are correlated with deletion as well.   
Our third sample corrects for one additional confounder – tracts in the RD sample may lie 
in close proximity to other sites that can be quite heterogeneous.  In particular, tracts in our RD 
sample may lie near (i) sites with HRS82 < 16.5 and HRS82 > 40.5 and (ii) sites proposed to the 
NPL in later years (which were not scored in the 1982 sample).  We therefore assemble a strict 
RD sample using only those tracts from the RD sample that are not themselves within 3km of 
another site that was unscored in 1982 or whose 1982 HRS score lies outside the [16.5, 40.5] 
interval.  Deleting tracts that violate this rule leaves our strict RD sample with 818 tracts 




Our panel strategy controls for time-invariant unobservables that cause neighborhoods to 
have an above or below average distribution of housing values both before and after their receipt 
of treatment.  We begin with the standard hedonic specification that relates tract or block housing 
values with contemporaneous tract or block attributes.  We then use panel data techniques, 19 
 
differencing across the 2000 and 1990 specifications in order to control for time invariant 
unobservables at the tract or block level. 
Summarizing our identification strategy, we rely on (i) the RD or strict RD samples to 
ensure that sites which are listed, and those that are not yet in listed, are similar in their 
unobservables, and (ii) panel methods to further control for time-varying unobservables.  To 
identify the effect of deletion, we rely primarily on the panel methods to control for time-
invariant unobservables. 
 
4   Regression Models 
4.1   Census Tracts – Main Specification 
We begin with a basic hedonic regression model relating owner-occupied housing prices 
to the characteristics of the house and the neighborhood.  
 
(1)          , 
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    ,       , 
    ,       , 
    ,       , 
    ,      
      , 
   
 
The subscript   indexes tracts that lie within a 3km buffer of an ever-proposed NPL site.  A tract 
is included as long as any part of it falls within the 3km buffer.      , 
   is the natural log of the 
 
th percentile of owner-occupied housing values in tract   in year        1990,2000 .    is a 
vector containing  characteristics of the housing stock along with the socioeconomic and 
demographic attributes of the tract.  These variables and the housing value distributions are 
summarized in Tables 3 (a) and (b) for our RD and strict RD samples.    
  are time-invariant 
tract-level unobservables specific to houses in the  
th percentile, and   , 
 
 is a tract-percentile-year 
unobservable.  
Our main variable of interest is the exposure of the tract in 1990 or 2000 to sites that are 
deleted by that time period.  Other variables of interest are exposure of the tract to sites that are 
proposed or listed.  Exposure is defined as the share of the land area in a tract that falls into 3km 
buffers surrounding NPL sites.
25  Specifically, we first use GIS to draw 3km buffers around each 
NPL site.  A tract’s exposure to NPL sites at each stage of remediation is then defined as the 
ratio of its area of overlap with the 3km buffers drawn around sites at that stage to its total area.  
Further detail on the calculation of tract exposures, including illustrative maps, is included in 
Appendix A2.  We also describe in more detail below how we handle situations in which a tract 
is simultaneously exposed to multiple sites at the same stage of the remediation process. 
                                                            
25 Note that EPA defines site location by the geocoordinates of the site’s centroid.  Sites may vary greatly in size, 
however, and we would expect the geographic “reach” of larger sites to be greater.  Without specific GIS 
information describing the boundaries of all sites, our best option is to use centroid geocoordinates to indicate 
location. 20 
 
We use   ,     to represent exposure of tract   to sites that are deleted by 1 Jan 1990, 
and   ,     to represent the corresponding measure for 1 Jan 2000.    ,     and   ,     similarly 
represent exposure of the tract to sites that are proposed by 1 Jan 1990 and 1 Jan 2000, 
respectively.    ,     and   ,     correspond to listed status. 
Next, we take the difference between the 1990 and 2000 regression models (restricting 
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The coefficient   
  provides a measure of the appreciation of housing values at the  
th 
percentile resulting from deletion of the site relative to the pre-proposal baseline.  Consider tracts 
whose land area falls within the 3km buffer and suppose that the site status changes from listed 
in 1990 to deleted in 2000.  The variable measuring the share of the tracts’ exposure to deletion 
goes from 0 to 1 for tracts that are fully within the 3km buffer, and from 0 to a positive value 
(bounded at one) for tracts that are partially within the 3km buffer.  Accounting for the natural 
log in the dependent variable, a one-unit increase in exposure to deleted sites would imply that 
house values at the  
th percentile appreciate by 100       
   
 
     
      1  . (Kennedy, 1981)  
Because this transformation does not significantly change any of our results, we ignore it and 
simply discuss parameter estimates in the text of this report in order to streamline the exposition.  
Table 2 summarizes the interpretation of all the coefficients. 
The change in exposure to proposed sites and the change in exposure to sites in the final 
listing stage similarly capture the change in house values associated with these steps in the 
remediation process.  When a site moves from being not proposed in 1990 to the proposed 
category in 2000, the variable marking the change in exposure to proposed sites for a tract lying 
fully inside the 3km buffer takes the value 1.  A negative   
  indicates that the  
th percentile of 
the housing value distribution drops in response to increased exposure to proposed sites.  When 
the site progresses from proposed status in 1990 to listed status in 2000, the change in exposure 
                                                            
26 Our conservative interpretation of the coefficients in the panel analysis is that they measure the capitalization into 
the housing values resulting from the cleanup (Kuminoff and Pope, 2010).  Capitalization into housing values is in 
itself valuable information for policymakers in judging the benefits from Superfund cleanup and affects the local 
economy including the property tax base. If the coefficients are in fact stable over time, the estimates can be further 
interpreted as measures of willingness-to-pay. To our knowledge, with two years of data, it is not possible to test this 
assumption of stability of coefficients. 
Looking across deciles, we assume only that the tract-level unobservable affecting the θ
th percentile house 
in 1990 has to be the same tract-level unobservable affecting the θ
th percentile house (whatever house that may be) 
in 2000.  We do not take the restrictive interpretation that the θ
th percentile house in 1990 has to be the same θ
th 
percentile house in 2000.   21 
 
to proposed sites for a tract lying fully inside the buffer takes the value -1, offsetting the original 
change when the site was originally proposed.  
 
4.3    Census Blocks 
The cross-section and panel regression models for census blocks are defined analogously 
to equations (1) and (2), except that (i) block median values replace within-tract percentiles of 
the house value distribution, and (ii) exposure is defined by a count of Superfund sites at each 
stage of remediation lying within a certain distance of the centroid of each block.  The baseline 
sample is comprised of blocks contained in all census tracts that have some overlap with the 3km 
buffer surrounding an NPL site.  Table 4 summarizes the block data for the all-NPL sample.  
Summary statistics for the RD sub-samples could not be released because of census clearance 
rules. 
We run two separate regression specifications at the block level, each with a unique set of 
variables of interest.  In the first block-level regression model, we include the counts of NPL 
sites located less than   km from the centroid of census block   at time   that are proposed (  , 
  ), 
listed (  , 
  ), and deleted (  , 
  ).  We use four distances (i.e., < 0.25, < 0.5, < 1, and < 3km) – one 
appears in each of four separate specifications.  In the second block-level regression model, we 
include the counts of NPL sites located within various distance bands from the centroid of the 
census block   at time   that are proposed (   , 
 , ), listed (  , 
 , ), and deleted (  , 
 , ).  We 
simultaneously use four distance bands (i.e, 0-1, 1-2, 2-3, and 3-5km) in a single specification.  
The interpretation of the coefficients on the count variables is as follows.  Consider a case 
in which a site is within 0.25km of the centroid of block  .  The site is listed on the NPL in 1990, 
but is deleted before 2000.  The variable measuring the change in the number of sites that are 
deleted from the NPL lying within 0.25km from the centroid of the block takes the value 1, while 
the variable indicating the change in the number of listed sites takes the value -1.  The net effect 
on house values in this block from the site being deleted relative to when the site was in the pre-
proposal stage is   . 
 
4.4 House  Analysis 
    In this part of the analysis, we turn our attention to repeat-sales household level data from 
Dataquick Information Systems.  In particular, we use information on how Superfund 
remediation activity at nearby sites affects actual housing transaction prices.  We begin our 
discussion of the house-level model by considering the following hedonic price function: 
(3)       , ,       , , 
′       ,           , ,  22 
 
  indexes individual houses,   indexes census tracts, and   indexes times at which house   is sold.  
    , ,  measures the natural log of the transaction price,   , ,  represents a vector of Superfund 
site exposure variables (in particular, the number of Superfund sites at various stages of 
remediation – discovered, proposed, listed, and deleted – within 3km of house  ),   ,  is a scalar 
neighborhood unobservable that is allowed to vary over time,
27 and    represents unobserved 
time-invariant attributes of house  .  Similar to the census tract/block analysis, each coefficient in 
this specification measures the effect of exposure to a site of a particular status relative to the 
pre-discovery stage. 
Consider a house   that sells at two points in time,   and   (in this analysis, we restrict 
our attention to houses that sell more than once).
28  Differencing the hedonic price function 
across repeat sales: 
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While this procedure eliminates   , we are still left with    
 ,   (i.e., the change in neighborhood 
unobservable between periods   and  ).  Therefore, we proceed by taking the average of each 
“~” variable across all houses in   that sold in years   and   (denoted by the set Ω 
  ): 
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Differencing-out these average values: 
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OLS estimation of equation (7) controls for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the house 
level, and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity at the tract level.  In other specifications 
                                                            
27 In our analysis, we treat census tracts as neighborhoods, fitting with the definition of a tract used by the Census 
Bureau. 
28 In our analysis, we pool multiple price differences for houses that sell more than twice in the same regression and 
cluster standard errors at the level of the house.  Table 5 reports summary statistics for the set of houses that sell 
once along with the set of houses that sell multiple times.  In general, the set of repeat-sales houses look quite 
similar in most dimensions, although multi-sale houses do tend to be smaller and less expensive.  See Gatzlaff and 
Haurin (1997) for a discussion of sample selection bias in repeat-sales models. 23 
 
designed to demonstrate the importance of these controls, we estimate the model using (i) only 
house fixed effects, (ii) only tract-by-year fixed effects, or (iii) no fixed effects at all.  In (i) and 
(iii) we do include a set of year dummies to control for market-wide appreciation. 
 
 
5 Data   
5.1 Data  Sources 
Census tract data are from Geolytics Neighborhood Change Database, which has 
reapportioned census data from 1980, 1990 and 2000 into census tract boundaries that are fixed 
in 2000.  Restricted-access census block data for 1990 and 2000 are from the US Census Bureau 
and were analyzed at the Triangle Census Research Data Center.  Housing transactions data are 
from Dataquick Information Systems, used under a licensing agreement with Duke University 
Department of Economics.  The EPA provided detailed data on all sites ever proposed to the 
National Priority List.  The HRS 1982 scores that we use to construct our RD and strict RD 
sample of sites (described in section 5.4) are from the dataset compiled and published by 
Greenstone and Gallagher (2008).  We also use their dataset to construct the “intersection 
sample” which we use to provide a comparison of our study with theirs (see Appendix A3).  The 
Consumer Price Index used to deflate housing prices is compiled by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and is based upon a 1982 Base of 100.
29 
 
5.2  Construction of Compatible Tract and Block Samples 
To construct our sample of tracts, we use shapefiles from Geolytics to identify all tracts 
that fall within 3km buffers of NPL sites.  To identify the block sample, we begin with the 
Geolytics tract identifiers from the tract sample.  First, using these Geolytic tract identifiers, we 
find the corresponding tracts in the restricted access data.  The restricted data uses ESRI 
shapefiles to create the crosswalks between the 1990 and 2000 data.  The Geolytics and ESRI 
shapefiles, while similar, are not identical.  In particular, several tract identifiers exist in the 
Geolytics tract data but not in the ESRI-based restricted access data.  Second, after identifying 
the relevant tracts in the restricted access data, we identify the corresponding blocks within those 
tracts.  Third, we calculate the distance between the centroids of these blocks and the NPL sites.  
We then restrict our block sample to include only those blocks whose centroids fall within 5km 
of the nearest NPL site.  Doing so provides us with a natural treatment group (i.e., those blocks 
falling within a 3km buffer around each site) and a corresponding set of control blocks (i.e., 
those blocks lying 3-5km from each site).  This restriction leads to several blocks being dropped 
                                                            
29 http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Consumer_Price_Index/HistoricalCPI.aspx?rsCPI_currentPage=1 24 
 
due to their large sizes.  Third, we compare our tracts and block samples, and find substantial, 
though not complete overlap between the two.  To summarize, the first difference stems from the 
differences in the Geolytics and ESRI shapefiles.  The second difference stems from dropping 
blocks whose centroids lay > 5km from the nearest site. 
We end up with two tract samples – (i) the initial sample, which includes all tracts that 
fall within 3km buffers around the NPL sites; and (ii) the final sample, which drops tracts that 
are not represented by any corresponding blocks in the restricted access block sample.
30  Our 
report, which aims to compare tract and block results, provides regression results from this 
second tract sample.  Regression results based on the first tract sample, available from the 
authors, are similar to those using the second tract sample. 
We repeat our analysis using a 5km sample. To construct that sample of tracts, we 
identify all tracts that fall within 5km buffers of NPL sites. The corresponding construction of 
the block sample drops blocks whose centroids lie more than 7km from the nearest NPL sites. 
 
5.3  Construction of the House Sample 
The housing transactions dataset from Dataquick contains many observable 
characteristics for each house (e.g. number of bedrooms, square footage, etc.) as well as the 
transaction price, loan amount, transaction date, latitude and longitude coordinates and the year 
2000 census tract identifier.  Each property is uniquely identified in the data, which allows the 
creation of a panel data set at the house-level.  In an effort to remove outliers, houses observed in 
the top and bottom 1% of the price and square footage distribution are dropped, as well as the top 
1% of the distributions of the number of bedrooms and the number of bathrooms.  Houses with 
missing attribute or location data are also dropped from the dataset. 
An unfortunate feature of the transactions data is that Dataquick overwrites the 
characteristics recorded for a given property in previous transactions if a newer transaction is 
recorded with different and presumably updated information.  However, in certain 
circumstances, if the renovation is on the scale of a large addition or major construction, the 
transaction will be flagged as having such an improvement.  The implication for panel analysis is 
an inability to observe some changes to properties, since any moderate change made to the 
property is retroactively applied to all records in the data.  As a result, all observable 
characteristics will drop out of any repeat sales analysis.  To combat the presence of homes that 
likely have changed in substantial ways, homes that are observed to appreciate (depreciate) more 
than 50% on an annualized basis, have the major construction data flag, transact with a loan 
                                                            
30 To be specific, only few tracts are dropped.  The strict RD sample contains 830 tracts that represented in both the 
block and final tract samples, after dropping 19 tracts that were not represented in the block sample.  The 
corresponding figure for the RD sample is 1,482 tracts, after dropping 19 tracts that were not represented in the 
block sample.  The corresponding figure for the All-NPL sample is 10,062 tracts, after dropping 133 tracts. 25 
 
amount greater than the transaction price by $5,000, or are observed to transact twice or more in 
any 12 month span are dropped from the sample.  This procedure, of course, runs the risk of 
dropping any houses that appreciated precisely because of improvements made in response to 
Superfund site remediation.  This is, therefore, another way in which our valuation exercise is 
conservative. 
Even with house fixed effects, concern still remains that properties with unobserved 
changes are resident in the dataset.  If changes in properties are not correlated in any way with 
Superfund site exposure, then unobserved property improvements should not bias any results.  
However, in a repeat-sales model, the price effects of proximity to Superfund sites are identified 
by changes in site status.  If, for example, there is a correlation between home improvement and 
Superfund site remediation, the estimated price effects of hazardous waste cleanup will be biased 
upwards as it will be impossible to distinguish between those paying for improved environmental 
quality and those paying for improved housing.  Mastromonaco (2010) checks for this 
possibility, but finds no evidence that changes in Superfund site status (proposed, listed, deleted) 
affects the likelihood of an improvement. 
We use data from four housing markets – northern New Jersey, the Los Angeles 
Metropolitan Area, the Boston Metropolitan Area, and southwestern Connecticut.  They were 
chosen because Dataquick began collecting information in these housing markets prior to 1990.  
Because much of the activity associated with the Superfund program occurred during the 1990’s, 
having coverage back to this point is important for a successful analysis. 
 
5.4  Construction of the Sample of Sites: All-NPL, RD and Strict RD 
We begin with all sites that have been ever proposed to the NPL (before Jan 1, 2010) in 
the contiguous US.  Of these, we excluded 10 sites that had been proposed to the NPL but whose 
date of proposal was not recorded.
31  Our all-NPL sample contains tracts surrounding 1,722 ever-
proposed sites.  Our RD sample contains tracts surrounding 221 sites scored in 1982 whose HRS 
scores are between 16.5 and 40.5.  Our strict RD sample contains tracts surrounding 187 sites 
from the RD sample that are not proximate to any other sites not contained in that sample.  The 






31 The only information we have on these 10 sites are they were eventually recorded as non-NPL sites. 
32 All but two sites had EPA verified geo-coordinates; for those two sites (NJN000206276, NYN000206282), the 
EPA provided two sets of coordinates for each site were identical.  26 
 
6 Results 
6.1   Summary Statistics 
Tables 3 (a) and (b) summarize the tract data.  In particular, they report means and standard 
deviations of tract attributes for the set of tracts surrounding the sites that we use in our RD and 
strict RD samples.  Table 4 reports summary statistics for the 323,682 census blocks that 
correspond to the all-NPL sample.  Table 5 reports sample sizes and average prices for the full 
sample of housing transactions from four separate housing markets – the Boston and Los 
Angeles metropolitan areas, northern New Jersey, and southwestern Connecticut. 
 
6.2 Tract  Analysis   
Deletion of sites from the NPL – Main Results  
Our preferred estimates are from the panel analysis of tracts that are in the strict RD 
sample.  Recall that this sample and specification are designed to deal with several potential 
confounders.  The panel specification controls for time-invariant unobservables that are 
correlated with sites’ statuses.  The RD sample controls for unobservables (time-invariant or 
time-varying) that are correlated with sites’ listing; the strict RD sample additionally controls for 
heterogeneity associated with exposure to sites other than the 1982 sites that have narrow HRS 
scores.  Observations are weighted by tract counts of owner-occupied housing units, and robust 
standard errors account for heterosekedacity. 
Table 6 shows results from the panel specification for the strict RD sample.  The results 
indicate that the deletion of a site from the NPL raises nearby housing values, but the 
appreciation, in percentage terms, is more prominent at the lower deciles of the within-tract 
housing value distribution.  As seen in panel A, carrying a site through the remediation process 
to deletion raises house values by between 17.4% and 20.0%  between the 10
th and 40
th 
percentiles, and by 15.4% at the median and 11.4% at the 60th percentile.  All of these effects are 
statistically and economically significant.  The effects of deletion are not statistically significant 
above the 60th percentile of the housing value distribution.  The higher percentage appreciation 
among the lower deciles of the housing value distribution is partly due to the lower absolute 
value of these houses.  Panel B presents the results using housing value levels as the dependent 
variable.  The appreciation amounts to $5,980 at the 10th percentile, $9,530 at the 30th 
percentile, and $8,796 at the median.  Deletion does not lead to a statistically significant 
appreciation in housing values at the upper deciles of the within-tract distribution, though the 
point estimate at the 70
th percentile is significant at the 10% level. 
Table 7 shows results from the panel specification for the RD sample.  The results mirror 
those from the strict RD sample except the magnitudes of deletion effects are even greater.  27 
 
Carrying a site through the remediation process to deletion from the NPL raises nearby housing 
values, and the appreciation, in percentage terms, is more prominent at the lower deciles of the 
within-tract housing value distribution. The appreciation amounts to 30.0% at the 10
th percentile, 
21.1% at the median, and 15.1% at the 90th percentile. Similar to the strict RD sample, 
appreciation measured in levels in the RD sample is also concentrated at the lower percentiles.  
The appreciation amounts to $9,924 at the 10
th percentile and $8,622 at the 80th percentile. 
 
Deletion of sites from the NPL – Other Specifications  
We examine a variety of alternative specifications for the strict RD sample and RD 
sample.  First, we estimate an unweighted specification for the strict RD sample and the RD 
sample.  Results from those regressions, presented in Table 8(a) columns 1-3 and 4-6 are 
comparable to those from the weighted regressions.  For the strict RD sample, we continue to 
find that carrying a site through the remediation process to deletion raises housing values at the 
lower deciles.  In particular, the unweighted regressions indicate that house values appreciate by 
20.8% at the 20th percentile and 16.8% at the median.  For the RD sample, we find that deletion 
raises housing values by 33.1% at the 20
th percentile, 23.9% at the median, and 24.8% at the 80
th 
percentile.  
Second, to address the possibility that the errors are spatially correlated, we calculate 
clustered standard errors.  Ideally, we should cluster the standard errors over groups of tracts that 
lie in close proximity to one another, as these errors are likely to be spatially correlated.  
However, because the next available level of geographical identifier is the county, we take the 
practical step of estimating standard errors clustered at the county level.  The drawback of this 
approach is that clustering on too aggregate a geographical region will lead to overly large 
standard error estimates.  Table 8(a) presents standard errors clustered at the county level, 
estimated for the strict RD sample (columns 7-9) and the RD sample (columns 10-12).  The 
estimates for the RD sample are statistically significant, but the estimates for the smaller strict 
RD sample are no longer statistically significant with clustering. 
Third, to explore the spatial extent of the effects of deletion, we repeat our analysis using 
5km buffers when creating the strict RD and RD samples. Table 8(b) columns 1-3 reveals that 
with the larger definition of neighborhoods near NPL sites, deletion no longer yields statistically 
significant estimates of appreciation in housing values in the strict RD sample.  Comparison of 
these results with our earlier results from Table 6, where neighborhoods are defined narrowly 
using 3km buffers, suggests that the larger neighborhood definition lumps nearby affected 
houses with unaffected houses, thereby diluting the effects of deletion.  For the RD sample, these 
larger definitions of neighborhoods near NPL sites still yield results indicating that deletion leads 
to statistically significant appreciation in housing values (Table 8(b), columns 4-6), but these 28 
 
point estimates are less than half the magnitude of those measured with the narrower 3km 
definition of neighborhoods in Table 7.  
Finally, for comparison, we show results from the all-NPL sample in Table 8(c) (with and 
without weights).  In contrast to the RD and strict RD samples, the all-NPL sample does not 
control for unobserved heterogeneity between treated and untreated tracts.  We find estimates 
that are much smaller in magnitude in the all-NPL sample (i.e., 3.1% at the median and 3.4% at 
the 80
th percentile in the weighted regression and 3.1% at the 80
th percentile in the unweighted 
regression). 
 
Listing of a site to the NPL 
Considering the estimates recovered from the tract strict RD sample in Table 6, we find 
that listing does not have a statistically significant positive effect on housing prices.  Using the 
RD sample in Table 7, we find statistically significant effects in the lower deciles.  There, when a 
tract goes from zero to full exposure, housing values appreciate by 15.1% at the 10th percentile, 
10.4% at the 30th percentile, and 7.5% at the median. The block analysis of the strict RD sample 
finds smaller magnitudes of appreciation for listing than deletion, particularly within smaller 
distances from the sites. As described in Table 10, reaching final listing status results in 
statistically significant appreciation, ranging from 13.3% to 5.2% in blocks lying < 1km and < 
3km from the site. In the block analysis using the RD sample, described in Table 11, the effect is 
approximately 4% in blocks lying < 1km and < 3km from the site. 
 The smaller magnitude of appreciation from listing compared to deletion can be 
explained by the countervailing pressures on housing values that arise when a site is listed – final 
listing reduces housing values by confirming the severe nature contamination of that site, but it 
also increases housing values by signaling that the site will be remediated.
33 
 
Proposal of a site to the NPL 
Taken as a whole, our results indicate that proposal to the NPL results in the depreciation 
of nearby housing values.  The effect of proposal measured using the all-NPL sample ranges 
from -7.2% to -8.9%, as seen in Table 8(c).  The RD tract analysis, seen in Table 7, indicates that 
proposal results in depreciation in housing values ranging from -$5,355 at the median to   -
$11,648 at the 90
th percentile.  Estimates in percentage terms are not statistically significant. 
                                                            
33 Note that, according to how we define Superfund remediation milestones, sites having achieved the “construction 
complete” designation (without having been deleted from the NPL) will be coded as being in the listing stage.  The 
positive effects of listing that we find in the RD sample could be indicative of value that the housing market places 
on the construction complete designation. 29 
 
Although the results in the strict RD samples suggest a much larger depreciation in 
response to proposal on the NPL, we treat these results with caution. Only four sites (affecting 19 
tracts and blocks therein), whose proposal status changed during the 1990’s, drive these results; 
therefore, the results may not extend to other sites and tracts.  The depreciation in the strict RD 
tract sample ranges from -39.6% to -44.7% (see Table 6).  Note that this problem of a few sites 
driving the results does not affect the estimates pertaining to deletion and listing in the strict RD 
sample because there exists fairly sizable variation in the exposure to listed and deleted sites 
between 1990 and 2000 (as seen in Figure 1).  Similarly, this issue does not arise in RD sample 
(for proposal, listing or deletion).  
Depreciation in nearby housing values in response to the proposal of a site to the NPL 
can be explained by two channels.  First, the proposal of the site may have provided new 
information to the market about the presence or severity of a harmful site.  Second, even if the 
market is already aware of the site and the extent of contamination, the proposal of site to the 
NPL may further decrease housing values by stigmatizing the neighborhood (Messer et al, 2006).  
Nevertheless, the proposal-induced depreciation is more than offset at the lower end of the 
within-tract housing value distribution by the time the sites are deleted.  As described earlier, the 
estimated coefficients on deletion, which measure the effect of deletion on housing values 
relative to values at the pre-proposal stage, indicate that the Superfund remediation process, 
taken in its entirety, lead to an overall appreciation in housing values.   
The revelation of new information to the market by the proposal of the site to the NPL 
and the subsequent depreciation in housing values is not a cost that is appropriately attributed to 
the Superfund program. In contrast, depreciation resulting from stigmatization of the 
neighborhood following the proposal of the site to the NPL can be viewed as a cost of the 
program.  Messer et al (2006) suggest ways in which the Superfund program can reduce the 
stigmatization of neighborhoods, such as by expediting the remediation process. 
 
Estimation Issue #1: Time varying observables and deletion status 
The estimation issue in identifying the effect of deletion is that the ever-proposed sites 
that are eventually deleted in our study period may differ systematically from ever-proposed sites 
that do not reach this milestone in our study period.  While correlated unobservables are certainly 
a legitimate concern, we find evidence in the literature that suggests they may not be a serious 
problem in the current context.  Sigman’s (2001) study of the pace of progress at Superfund sites 
suggests that the impact of correlated unobservables on our estimate of deletion is likely to be 
limited.  In particular, our panel approach addresses variables (observed or unobserved) that are 
time invariant.  The following variables are modeled as time-invariant in Sigman (2001) – 
socioeconomic characteristics, voter turnout, the technical complexity of the cleanup, and the 
presence of potentially liable parties (PRPs) responsible for the cleanup.  Our panel approach 30 
 
controls for time-varying observables (listed in Table 3(b)), but any time-varying unobservables 
could potentially create a problem for our estimation strategy.  Factors modeled as time-varying 
in Sigman’s study are, however, found to have little influence on sites’ progress.  Public funding 
does not influence the progress from listing to the Record of Decision (ROD), and legislative 
influence does not affect the sites’ progress from listing through ROD to construction complete.  
While public funding does influence the pace of progress from listing to ROD, Sigman (2001) 
notes that most funding for cleanup at this stage comes from PRPs under their agreement with 
the EPA.  
 
Estimation Issue # 2: Variation in extent of remediation 
 
A related issue is whether sites that receive the cleanup treatment are likely to have 
received systematically more intensive cleanup than comparison sites that have yet to receive 
cleanup.  If this concern is valid, then our estimates are larger on average than those that would 
be realized by the cleanup of sites in general.  
 
Our estimation strategy addresses this issue by using fixed effects to control for time-
invariant unobservables, and by comparing sites that are as similar in terms of their HRS scores 
(which reduces the possibility for variation in the extent of cleanup to arise from time-varying 
unobservables).  Moreover, previous studies suggest that the extent of cleanup does not vary 
systematically based on neighborhood characteristics.  The EPA did not choose less permanent 
cleanup options for sites with lower median household income or with greater shares of non-
white residents at the zipcode level (Gupta et al., 1996).   The expenditure to avert an average 
cancer case in NPL sites was not influenced by mean income or minority population within a 1-
mile ring of NPL sites (Hamilton and Viscusi, 1999).  Among the less hazardous sites, however, 
variation can arise from constituents’ political activity (Hamilton and Viscusi, 1999).  
 
Hamilton and Viscusi (1999) note that although EPA’s directive set a baseline of cleanup 
standards, cleanup is set at more stringent levels in states with stricter standards.
34  However, the 
state-level source of variation in the extent of cleanup would only bias our study if we were to 
systematically compare cleanup in sites located in more stringent states with sites yet to be 
cleaned that are located in less stringent states. 
 
                                                            
34 Viscusi and Hamilton (1999) provide details on this point. The 1991 EPA directive set a baseline of cleanup 
standards – the cumulative carcinogenic site risk to an individual based on reasonable exposure for both current and 
future land use is less than 10
-4 and the non-carcinogenic hazard quotient is less than one – but in practice the 
cleanup goal is more stringent.  In turn, variation in environmental cleanup targets can arise from state-level 
variation in environmental standards.  The 1986 Congress directed that remedial actions must meet federal standards 
that are “applicable, relevant or appropriate” requirements (ARARs), and these actions must generally meet state 
ARARs, if stricter than federal ones.   
 31 
 
Estimation Issue #3: Defining exposure to overlapping sites 
Consider a tract that overlaps with the 3km buffers surrounding two NPL sites with the 
same remediation status at a given point in time.  Suppose that the tract contains three distinct 
areas of overlap: (a) overlap with the buffer of the first NPL site, (b) overlap with the buffer of 
the second NPL site, and (c) overlap with the area of intersection between the buffers of the first 
and second NPL sites.  We calculate the tract’s exposure as the sum of areas (a), (b) and (c).  In 
other words, we do not double-count the area of intersecting overlap (c).  This approach limits 
the maximum exposure for a tract to sites at any particular stage of remediation to be 1.  The 
drawback of this approach is that it does not account for the possibility that simultaneous 
exposure to two deleted sites may have different implications for housing value appreciation 
compared with exposure to one deleted site – it simply controls for share of a tract’s area that is 
exposed to any deleted site.  The alternative of simply adding together areas of intersection 
between buffers of multiple NPL sites (so that the exposure variable could exceed 1) is, however, 
equally arbitrary.  One might suspect that the marginal impact of exposure to additional sites lies 
somewhere between these two extremes, declining with additional sites. 
This potential problem turns out to be not much of a problem at all in our preferred 
sample (i.e., strict RD).  In particular, we examine the extent to which tracts in the strict RD 
sample contain areas of overlap with intersecting buffers of two or more sites at the same stage 
of remediation at the same point in time.  As reported in Table A2.1, which can be found in 
Appendix A2, this happens in very few tracts.  Specifically, in only 5 instances out of 1,666 tract 
x year combinations (i.e., 833 tracts observed in 2 years) do we find overlap with intersecting 
buffers of deleted sites, and in only 12 instances do we find overlap with intersecting buffers of  
listed sites.    
 
Supplementary Analysis: Spatial distribution of Superfund sites in relation to cheaper houses 
within the tract 
We find that the appreciation of housing values in response to site listing and deletion is 
concentrated in the lower deciles of the within-tract distribution of housing values (particularly 
when we consider our RD and strict RD samples).  These results make sense if NPL sites are 
located closer to the lower-value houses within each tract.  We directly examine whether this is 
the case using transactions data from the four housing markets described in Table 5.  We first 
make housing transactions comparable over time by differencing from each the mean price 
amongst all houses that transacted in the particular housing market in the same year.  Within 
each tract, we then calculate the percentiles of the distribution of demeaned prices (pooled over 
time).  We next determine the number of Superfund sites (across all stages of remediation) 
within 1km of each house.  Binning houses into within-tract deciles, we report the average 
exposure of houses in each decile to sites at that distance.  To facilitate the comparison across 32 
 
different markets (which have different total numbers of sites), we normalize each exposure 
variable by the average exposure to sites within that market (i.e., the line describing exposure in 
each market is centered around one). 
The results are summarized in Figure 4.  In three out of the four markets, there is stark 
evidence that houses in the lowest deciles of the within-tract price distribution are more likely to 
be exposed to NPL sites than are houses in the higher deciles.  For metro LA, houses in the first 
decile are 9.8% more likely than the average house in that market to be exposed to a site, while 
houses in the second decile are 5.7% more likely.  Houses in the ninth decile are 2.1% less likely 
than the average to be exposed at this distance.  For Boston and southwestern Connecticut the 
pattern is even more severe.  Houses in the first decile in Boston are 29.1% more likely to be 
exposed to an NPL site, while the comparable number for southwestern Connecticut is 37.6%.  
At the second decile, the numbers are 21.6% and 27.7%, respectively. Houses in Boston in the 
ninth decile are 25.8% less likely than the average to be exposed at this distance, while the 
comparable number for southwestern Connecticut is 20%. Of the four markets we consider, the 
pattern is weakest in northern New Jersey.  There, the highest likelihood of exposure comes at 
the 2
nd decile (5.5% more likely) while the lowest comes at the 6
th, 8
th, and 9
th deciles, which are 
all 4.7% less likely than the average to be exposed.  These results provide strong confirmation 
that the patterns we recover in the tract-level analysis are being driven by the heterogeneous 
exposure across the within-tract distribution that we postulate. 
 
6.3   Block Analysis 
Deletion of a site from the NPL 
We directly investigate localized externalities from Superfund cleanup by examining 
median housing values at a very fine level of geographic precision – the census block.  
Analogous to our tract analyses, the panel estimates from the strict RD sample are our preferred 
estimates, since that sample and specification address several potential confounders.  Results 
from the block analysis confirm our earlier results from the tract analysis.  As seen in Table 10, 
carrying a site through the remediation process to deletion from the NPL results in statistically 
significant appreciation of median house values and the appreciation is larger in blocks located 
closer to the site.  Median housing values appreciate on average by 19.9%, 19.0% and 5.8% in 
blocks lying < 0.5km, < 1km, and < 3km from the site.  Median housing values in blocks lying < 
0.25 km do not show statistically significant appreciation, most likely because few houses are 
located within these short distances of Superfund sites, leading to imprecise estimates.  
Considering the distance bands (all of which are included in each regression specification), we 
find a similar pattern of greater appreciation in blocks closer to the site.  Carrying a site through 
the remediation process to deletion raises median house values by 19.4% in blocks lying 0-1 km 
from the site, and by only 8.4% in blocks lying 2-3km from the site.  The results for the strict 33 
 
RD, which is likely to contain only a few houses within each block, unsurprisingly, are heavily 
influenced by outliers.  For example, the point estimate for the 1-2km distance band is negative 
though statistically insignificant.  Deletion raises median house values by 20.7% in blocks lying 
3-5km from the site, possibly suggesting preferential sorting whereby those who choose to live 
some distance from the site (3-5km) have greater willingness-to-pay for remediation.  
Noteworthy, the magnitude of the appreciation for the median house value at blocks lying < 1km 
away from the site (19.0%) is comparable with that for the lower deciles of the house value 
distribution at the tract-level (17.4%-20.0% at the 10
th to the 40
th percentile).  In addition, the 
cross-sectional estimates from the strict RD sample (not shown) indicate that reaching deletion 
causes depreciation of house values in blocks lying near the site; this highlights the importance 
of differencing between 2000 and 1990 in order to remove correlated time invariant 
unobservables. 
Next we compare our preferred estimates from the strict RD sample with those from the  
RD and all-NPL samples. While the strict RD sample has the advantage of narrowing the 
unobservables, the larger RD and all-NPL samples have the advantage of larger sample sizes and 
thus their results are less prone to outliers. Results from the RD sample, presented in Table 11, 
indicate a smaller magnitude of appreciation than those from the strict RD sample.  In particular, 
carrying a site through the remediation process to deletion from the NPL is associated with only 
7.1% and 5.8% appreciation in median house values in blocks lying < 1km and < 3km from the 
site.  Similarly, reaching deletion is associated with appreciation of only 7.8%, 11.2%, 2.9% and 
2.9% in blocks lying 0-1km, 1-2km, 2-3km and 3-5km, respectively.
35  Results from the RD 
sample indicate that the magnitude of house value appreciation from reaching deletion declines 
as one moves further from the site.  Results from the all-NPL sample in Table 12 are similar in 
magnitude to those from the RD sample, ranging from 8.1% to 6.5% for blocks that lie < 0.5km 
to < 3km from the site.   
As was the case in the tract-level analysis, results using block-level data and standard 
errors clustered at the tract-level are comparable to those described in Tables 10-12. The 
comparison of the 3km and 5km block results are similar to our earlier comparison of the 3km 
and 5km tract results. Block results using the 5km strict RD sample are not statistically 
significant, while estimates from the 5km RD and All-NPL samples are about half the magnitude 
of the corresponding estimates from the 3km samples. These results underscore the localized 





35 Deletion causes smaller appreciation in median house values in blocks lying closer to the site (0-1km) than in 
blocks lying slightly further away (1-2km). These results suggest preferential sorting whereby those who choose to 
live closest to the site have a lower willingness-to-pay for remediation. These persons may choose to locate close to 
the site because they work on the sites.  34 
 
Proposal to and listing on the NPL 
For the strict RD sample, proposal to the NPL again results in large and statistically 
significant depreciation of median house values ranging from -24.7% to -37.3% in blocks lying 
<1km and < 3km from the site.  As was the case in the tract analysis, this result is driven by 
blocks in 19 tracts (described in Table 9) that were exposed to four sites in the strict RD sample 
that changed proposal status during the 1990’s.   As was the case in the tract analysis, this issue 
does not affect any of the other strict RD block-level results. 
The estimates from the RD and all-NPL samples yield mixed results with respect to site 
proposal.  Results based on the RD sample suggest that proposal has small positive effects on 
housing values, while the all-NPL sample yields small negative effects except at the farthest 
distance. 
In contrast to our earlier strict RD tract results (which found no effect), reaching listing 
status results in statistically significant appreciation using the panel specification and block-level 
data.  This effect ranges from 13.3% to 5.2% in blocks lying < 1km and < 3km from the site.  In 
this case, either (i) the promise of cleanup associated with final listing appears to outweigh the 
effect of confirming a site’s contamination level, or (ii) the inclusion of construction complete in 
with the listing status leads to appreciation. 
 
6.4 House  Analysis 
Using repeat-sales transactions data from Dataquick Information Services, we are able to 
model the effect of exposure to NPL sites at various stages of the remediation process at a very 
fine level of geographic and temporal resolution.  In particular, seeing individual houses transact 
on multiple occasions allows us to control for all time-invariant unobservable house attributes 
with house fixed effects.  Seeing houses at a fine level of geographic precision (i.e., latitude and 
longitude coordinates) allows us to also control for time-varying neighborhood unobservables 
using census tract fixed effects.  Controlling for both of these forms of heterogeneity turns out to 
be important for our results. 
We report results for each of the four housing markets discussed in Table 5 – the Los 
Angeles and Boston metropolitan areas, northern New Jersey, and southwestern Connecticut.  In 
particular, Tables 13 (a) and (b) report results for each market using site counts within a 3km 
radius of each house.  For each market, columns (1) - (4) report results from different 
specifications that are designed to illustrate the importance of each fixed effect control. Our 
preferred estimates are presented in column (1) which includes both house fixed effects and 
tract-by-year fixed effects, as specified in equations (7) - (11).  Column (2) drops the house fixed 
effects, but maintains the tract-by-year fixed effects.  This specification will control for 
neighborhood unobservables that may co-vary with Superfund exposure but will not control for 35 
 
within-tract house-level unobservable heterogeneity.  The opposite is true of the specification in 
column (3), which controls for house fixed effects but omits tract-by-year fixed effects.  The 
specification in column (4) does not include either set of fixed effects.  Note that, in 
specifications (3) and (4), we do include a set of year fixed effects to control for market-level 
price movements; in specifications (1) and (2), the tract-by-year fixed effects serve this role.  
Focusing first on the results in Table 13(a), we find evidence of benefits from Superfund 
cleanup in both northern New Jersey and Los Angeles metro.  In describing the benefits from 
Superfund remediation in our house-level analysis, we focus on the changes in housing values at 
deletion relative to the proposal stage.  We do not focus on the value of deletion relative to pre-
discovery in order to avoid incorporating housing value appreciation at the discovery stage that 
may be caused by other factors.  Specifically, in  New Jersey and Los Angeles, moving from pre-
discovery to the discovery stage, houses within 3km of a site sell for 15.8% and 3.2% more, 
respectively, after that site is discovered.  We do not interpret this appreciation in housing values 
as a causal effect of the discovery process.  Instead, we suspect that this pattern could arise when 
sites are discovered because an area is experiencing new construction.  That new construction 
would cause both the appreciation and contribute at the same time to discovery of the 
contaminated sites.  
Overall, deletion relative to the proposal stage raises housing values in northern New 
Jersey and metro Los Angeles, by 11.3% and 1% respectively.  Breaking these values into their 
component parts, we see that in northern New Jersey, listing (measured relative to proposal) 
causes a large increase – i.e., 12.8% in housing values.  Deletion (measured relative to listing) 
results in an additional 1% increase in house prices, suggesting that most of the benefits of 
cleanup have already been capitalized at the listing stage, reflecting either market expectations 
about cleanup or the role of the construction complete designation.  In the Los Angeles 
Metropolitan Area, we find smaller magnitudes of appreciation; listing relative to proposal 
raising housing values by 0.7% and deletion relative to listing raises housing values by only 
0.3%.  
 We note that, housing values after deletion are higher than those at the pre-discovery 
stage (29% in New Jersey and 5.1% in Los Angeles), but these entire values should not be 
interpreted as the benefits from the Superfund program.  As described, these values incorporate 
some housing value appreciation that is due to confounding events, such as re-development, at 
the discovery stage.   
Next we consider results in Table 13(b) for Boston and Southwestern Connecticut which 
exhibit a different pattern of housing prices in response to Superfund milestones described earlier 
for northern New Jersey and Los Angeles.  In Boston, prices drop by 7.6% with discovery, 
suggesting the discovery stage provides negative information to the housing market about the 
presence of contamination.  Proposal and listing have very little effect on housing prices, but 
moving from listing to deletion does lead to a 1.6% improvement in housing values (although 36 
 
that effect is not statistically significant).  In contrast to New Jersey and Los Angeles, housing 
values in Boston after deletion are lower than those at the pre-discovery stage, suggesting stigma 
against contaminated sites and neighborhoods can persist despite cleanup.  Finally, we turn to 
results from southwestern Connecticut where we fail to find evidence of significant effects at any 
stage of the cleanup process. 
In order to demonstrate the role played by house and tract-by-year fixed effects in 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, consider the results in columns (2) - (4) of each table.  
We find that, without house fixed effects, the overall benefit of deletion decreases in Boston, Los 
Angeles, and New Jersey.  This suggests that, in these markets, it is the lower priced houses 
within each census tract that receive Superfund treatment.  This is consistent with the results of 
the tract analysis, where it was the houses in the lower tail of the within-tract value distribution 
that were disproportionately exposed to Superfund sites (and the remediation of those sites).  
Without house fixed effects, the unobservables that make those houses “low-value” get 
confounded with the remediation activity, biasing downward the value ascribed to it. 
Conversely, taking out tract-by-year fixed effects, our estimates will be biased by the 
effect of changing unobserved neighborhood attributes.  When the overall benefit of deletion 
increases as a result of taking out these fixed effects (e.g., as in Boston), it suggests that 
otherwise improving neighborhoods were the ones that received treatment.  Indeed, failing to 
account for correlation with changing neighborhood attributes would lead one to grossly 
overstate the benefits of site deletion in Boston.  The opposite is suggested, in terms of how 
treatment was allocated, where the overall effect of remediation instead gets worse when tract-
by-year fixed effects are removed (e.g., as in New Jersey, Los Angeles, and Connecticut). 
Without any fixed effect controls (neither house nor tract-by-year), results are highly 
variable but generally exhibit much less evidence of benefits from Superfund remediation.  This 
simply confirms that, on average, Superfund sites are located nearer to lower-value homes 
(confirming one of the main conclusions of our census analysis) and cleanup activities tend to 
take place in otherwise declining neighborhoods. 
In summary, while our national-level census results imply significant benefits from site 
remediation when considering the Superfund program as a whole, our house-level results reveal 
that these benefits vary considerably across housing markets. We find that deletion (measured 
relative to proposal) causes a sizable appreciation in housing values in northern New Jersey 
(11.3%), but we find no statistically significant effect of deletion (measured relative to 
proposal) for LA metro, southwestern Connecticut or metro Boston.  While the appreciation seen 
in New Jersey indicates that some neighborhoods do recover post-cleanup,  the lower prices in 
Boston at deletion relative to pre-discovery (-6.1%) suggest, conversely, that stigma against 
contaminated sites and neighborhoods can also persist despite cleanup.  
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7   Conclusions  
Benefits from Superfund cleanup 
Using three different but complementary approaches, our study finds that deletion of sites 
from the NPL (which signals the completion of the Superfund cleanup process) raises owner-
occupied housing prices on average, but that there is considerable heterogeneity across specific 
housing markets.  Our national-level tract analysis finds that deletion of a site, measured relative 
to the pre-proposal stage, significantly raises housing values – by 18.2% at the 10th percentile, 
15.4% at the median, and 11.4% at the 60th percentile. This appreciation is concentrated at the 
lower deciles; no statistically significant appreciation is detected above the 60th percentile.  
Results at the block level indicate that the deletion of a site raises housing prices by 19.0% and 
5.8% for blocks lying within 1km and 3km, respectively.  Our tract and block results are 
remarkably similar – the 17.4% to 20.0% appreciation at the 10
th to the 40
th percentile of the 
within tract housing values is comparable to the 19.0% for blocks lying within 1km.  
Our repeat sales analysis reveals considerable heterogeneity across metropolitan areas. 
We find that deletion (measured relative to proposal) causes a sizable appreciation in housing 
values in northern New Jersey (11.3%), but we find no statistically significant effect of deletion 
(measured relative to proposal) for Los Angeles, southwestern Connecticut or Boston.  While the 
appreciation in New Jersey indicates that some neighborhoods do recover post-cleanup,  the 
lower prices in Boston at deletion relative to pre-discovery (-6.1%) suggest, conversely, that 
stigma against contaminated sites and neighborhoods can also persist despite cleanup.  
Our study and GG’s study reinforce each other in one important way – taken together, 
they rule out the case that benefits from a cleanup, measured as capitalization into housing 
values, extend across a large area.  Our finding that benefits are highly localized within the tract 
– relative to the case if benefits were diffused over a larger area – will make it more difficult for 
aggregate benefits to exceed the costs of cleanup.  Whether these benefits exceed cleanup costs 
is, however, an empirical question to be addressed should good estimates of costs become 
available (GAO, 2010). 
While our study focuses on the impact of deletion, we note that proposal to the NPL 
results in moderate depreciation in housing values in both the tract and block analyses when 
using the RD or all-NPL samples.  Nevertheless, the depreciation associated with proposal is 
more than offset at the bottom of the within-tract housing value distribution by the time the sites 
are deleted.  With regards to listing, the tract analysis finds no detectable effects in the strict RD 
sample, while the block analysis finds that housing prices appreciate by 13.3% and 5.2% in 
blocks lying < 1km and < 3km from the site.  At the block level, the positive effect of final 
listing in signaling that the site will be remediated appears to trump the negative effect of 
confirming the severity of the contamination of that site. 
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How can the estimates from our study inform the evaluation of the Superfund program?  
Our two estimates – (i) national-level estimates from the tract and block analyses and (ii) 
metropolitan area specific estimates from the house transaction analyses – provide 
complementary information for the evaluation of the Superfund program.  The national-level 
estimate is useful for a benefit-cost analysis of the entire Superfund program.  In particular, these 
estimates indicate that the gross benefit of the Superfund program is positive; this gross benefit 
could be compared with program costs in an efficiency analysis.  The national-level estimate also 
provides the best available information with which to perform a cost-benefit analysis of a 
particular candidate site when estimates are unavailable for the specific housing market 
containing that site.  Conversely, estimates that assess the remediation of multiple sites in a 
particular housing market are useful when performing a cost-benefit analysis of a specific site 
within that market.  These estimates capture features specific to that particular housing market, 
while avoiding biases associated with estimates based on a single site.  Estimates based on a 
particular housing market, of course, would not be applicable to sites outside that market.  
 
Methodological issues in estimating Superfund cleanup with census tract data 
Our analysis highlights a methodological issue that arises in assessing the impact of 
Superfund site remediation on housing prices using the Decennial Census data, given the highly 
localized nature of the externality in question.  Most importantly, when using publicly available 
census data, the analyst must consider within-tract heterogeneity, paying particular attention to 
the lower deciles of the housing value distribution.  Deletion from the NPL causes greater 
appreciation of housing values at the lower deciles (in percentage terms) in part because NPL 
sites tend to be situated near low-value houses within tracts.  We show this explicitly for three 
out of four markets using geo-coded housing transaction data.  Directly addressing the question 
of within-tract heterogeneity by using high-resolution census block data yields similar results.   
Nevertheless, our proposed method has its limits. Not all localized benefits detectable 
with finer resolution block- and house-level data may be found by an analysis of the tract-level 
housing price distribution.  However, given the reality that many hedonic studies are forced rely 
on tract-level data (Hanna, 2007; Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008; Grainger, 2010), the 
advantages of which include accessibility and nationwide coverage, our extension avoids an 
important source of bias that results from a narrow focus on the mean or median tract-level 





Caveat: The role of non-NPL sites 
We raise one important caveat with respect to our results.  We have assumed that only the 
status of NPL sites influences house prices, and we have ignored changes in the status of other 
nearby hazardous waste sites that were not placed on the NPL.  Proximate non-NPL sites may 
(or may not) have been cleaned-up by state or other federal agencies outside the Superfund 
program.  At present, the EPA does not maintain a list of verified coordinates of non-NPL sites 
to use in creating controls for the confounding impact of these sites.  While the EPA does 
catalogue information on sites that had been discovered but never proposed for listing on the 
NPL, the geo-coordinates for those sites have not been verified as reliable (in many cases, 
numerous different geo-coordinates are recorded for a single site), and there is no information 
about remedial actions that may have been taken by other state or federal agencies.  Indeed, this 
data limitation has constrained other studies (Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008; Kiel and 
Williams, 2007; Noonan et al. 2007).  It is difficult to sign the direction in which the presence of 
non-NPL sites might bias conclusions about NPL sites.  We highlight this as an important area 
for future data collection efforts. 
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  Table 1 – Summary of the Tract, Block and House Analyses   
     Tract   Block   House   
 Level  National  level  National level  MSA-level   
             
  Goal  Estimate   Estimate   Estimate metro-specific   
     national level  national level  average benefits from    
     average benefits.  average benefits.  multiple sites.   
             
 Accessibility Publicly available  Restricted access  Proprietary   
       to Census  Research  and expensive   
       Data Centers      
             
 Spatial  Census  tract  Census block  Individual houses   
 Resolution    Finer geographical  Finer geographical resolution than   
       resolution than tracts.  tracts and blocks.   
              
 Temporal  Decade  Decade  Annual   
  Resolution  (1990 & 2000)  (1990 & 2000)  Finer temporal resolution.   
             
  Prices  Stated values  Stated values  Sales value   
     which are prone  which are prone  Overcomes the misreporting of stated    
     to misreporting  to misreporting  values.  
             
 Housing  Assumes  Assumes  MSA-specific  markets   
  market  national market  national market      
             
     National-level   National-level   MSA-level analysis are more prone to   
     analysis are less  analysis are less  local (time-varying) unobservables.   
     prone to local  prone to local      
     (time-varying) (time-varying)      
     unobservables. unobservables.      
             
     Less realistic   Less realistic   More realistic definition of housing   
     definition of housing  definition of housing  of housing markets that buyers   
     markets that buyers  markets that buyers  face.  
     face.  face.      
         Detects the heterogeneity across    
         markets.   
               
  Notes: Italics indicates strengths of the research design.     










Table 2 – Interpretation of Coefficients 
Change in treatment Estimated  effect 
Not Proposed to Proposed  β1 
Not Proposed to Listed  β2 
Not Proposed to Deleted  β3 
Proposed to Listed  β2-β1 
Proposed to Deleted  β3-β1 
Listed to Deleted  β3-β2 




Table 3(a):  Summary Statistics, Census Tract Analysis RD and Strict RD Samples
 
  
Sample Strict RD (n=881) RD (n=1,454)
Year 1990 1990 2000 2000 1990 1990 2000 2000
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Prices of owner-occupied housing at various percentiles
10th $38,785 $27,747 $41,105 $24,449 $42,814 $31,497 $44,529 $27,999
20th $46,998 $32,631 $48,959 $28,141 $51,582 $36,826 $52,877 $33,058
30th $53,404 $36,540 $55,357 $32,008 $58,324 $41,027 $59,447 $37,352
40th $59,486 $40,688 $61,447 $35,772 $64,565 $44,960 $65,589 $41,124
50th $65,579 $44,759 $67,754 $41,856 $70,772 $48,787 $72,087 $46,254
60th $72,513 $50,210 $74,849 $46,628 $77,860 $53,919 $79,102 $50,947
70th $80,846 $56,785 $83,339 $52,647 $85,959 $59,291 $87,588 $57,341
80th $91,830 $64,733 $95,564 $62,736 $96,770 $66,070 $99,556 $67,070
90th $110,989 $77,747 $117,900 $82,793 $115,183 $77,336 $120,877 $84,360
Exposure to sites on the National Priority List
Proposal 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.01 0.09
Listed 0.35 0.37 0.24 0.33 0.45 0.39 0.39 0.40
Deletion 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.30 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.2846 
 
 
Table 3(b):  Summary Statistics, Census Tract Analysis RD and Strict RD Samples  
Notes: Housing unit density and population density are in counts per m
2 
  
Sample Strict RD (n=881) RD (n=1,454) 
Year 1990  1990 2000 2000 1990 1990  2000 2000
Variables Mean Std. Dev. MeanStd. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.
Covariates
% unit occupied 91.4 7.2 91.8 6.8 92.2 6.7  92.6 6.6
% owner occupied 67.5 20.3 68.0 21.2 66.1 21.4  66.6 22.2
Housing unit density 0.0006  0.0009 0.0006 0.0009 0.0006 0.0010  0.0006 0.0010
Population density 0.001  0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002  0.002 0.002
% Black 11.4 22.6 13.3 23.7 11.8 22.6  13.8 23.3
% Hispanic 3.8  8.0 5.9 10.7 5.4 10.5  8.1 13.5
% under 18 years old 25.2 5.7 25.1 5.8 25.1 5.8  25.1 5.8
% high school dropout 25.2 12.4 19.5 11.4 25.3 12.8  19.8 11.8
% college educated 18.6 13.4 22.2 15.5 18.5 13.1  22.5 15.5
% below poverty 13.0 11.6 12.8 10.7 12.7 11.7  12.3 10.5
% public assistance 8.0  7.3 8.6 7.3 7.8 7.2  8.3 6.9
% female headed HH  23.9 16.2 25.8 15.9 23.7 16.0  25.5 15.5
Mean HH income ($1,000s) $37  $16 $53 $23 $38 $16  $55 $23
% attached homes 7.2  17.3 7.7 17.2 7.3 16.6  8.0 16.9
% mobile homes 6.7  10.8 6.5 11.0 6.4 11.4  6.1 11.2
%  0-2 bedrooms 28.5 16.1 28.1 15.9 28.4 16.1  28.1 15.8
% 3-4 bedrooms 67.2 15.2 67.4 15.2 67.0 15.5  67.2 15.4
% units built within 5 years 8.6  10.8 7.5 9.7 7.9 10.4  7.1 9.2
% units built within 10 years 15.2 17.0 13.7 14.9 13.8 16.0  12.7 14.3
% same house in the 56.0 12.9 56.7 12.6 56.0 13.2  56.4 12.7






Table 4 – Summary Statistics, Census Block Analysis (N=323,682) 
      1990      2000 
 Mean
Std. 
Dev. Mean   Std. Dev
% Unit Occupied  0.945 0.082   0.948  0.082
% Owner occupied  0.719 0.243   0.732  0.244
Housing Unit Density  1.182 2.150   1.298  3.181
Population Density  2.911 4.181   3.193  6.493
% Black  0.102 0.245   0.122  0.253
% Hispanic  0.039 0.112   0.114  0.212
% under 18 years old  0.245 0.099   0.246  0.102
% Female Head of HH   0.262 0.153   0.285  0.160
% living in the same house in the last 5 years  0.401 0.340   0.605  0.333
% 25 Years & High School Dropout  0.176 0.218   0.140  0.200
% 25 Years & BA Degree  0.137 0.191   0.168  0.222
% Below Poverty Line  0.100 0.209   0.099  0.200
% Public Assistance  0.030 0.087   0.013  0.050
Mean Household Income  55212 45361   60443  52018
% Attached Homes  0.058 0.164   0.061  0.191
% Mobile Homes  0.042 0.141   0.034  0.157
% 0-2 Bedrooms  0.356 0.356   0.344  0.358
% 3-4 Bedrooms  0.608 0.357   0.617  0.361
% Units Built within 5 years  0.063 0.180   0.040  0.152
% Units Built within 10 years  0.116 0.249   0.076  0.210
Median Value of Housing Prices  140531 115778   141817  129107
Counts of Proposed Sites within 2-5km  0.0003 0.018   0.0001  0.010
Counts of Proposed Sites within 5km  0.002 0.044   0.001  0.025
Counts of Proposed Sites within 1km  0.010 0.100   0.003  0.056
Counts of Proposed Sites within 3 km  0.082 0.307   0.028  0.165
Counts of Final Listing Sites within 2-5km  0.001 0.039   0.002  0.045
Counts of Final Listing Sites within 5km  0.008 0.090   0.011  0.104
Counts of Final Listing Sites within 1km  0.041 0.205   0.053  0.234
Counts of Final Listing within 3 km  0.423 0.662   0.513  0.728
Counts of Deleted Sites within 2-5km  0.00005 0.007   0.0004  0.019
Counts of Deleted Sites within 5km  0.0002 0.015   0.002  0.044
Counts of Deleted Sites within 1km  0.001 0.035   0.010  0.099
Counts of Deleted Sites within 3 km  0.011 0.106   0.096  0.31148 
 
 
Table 5  –  Summary Statistics, House Level Analysis 
 
  Northern New Jersey  Los Angeles Metro  Boston Metro  Southwestern Conn 
  One Sale  Multi Sale  One Sale  Multi Sale  One Sale  Multi Sale  One Sale  Multi Sale 
Average  Price  $277,405 $252,952 $272,855 $252,836 $255,598 $245,787 $258,274 $260,317 
          
Number of houses by repeat sales          
    2 sales    101,751    613,180    163,295    83,053 
    3 sales    21,169    274,527    60,407    30,134 
    4 sales    3,619    100.904    19,001    8,661 
    5 sales    504    30,737    4,788    1,831 
          
Total Houses  471,267  127,043  1,211,770 1,019,348 410,865 247,491 188,436 123,679 








Table 6   –   Panel Analysis (1990-2000) of the strict RD sample, i.e., all tracts within 3km buffer of the 221 NPL sites with 1982 
                    HRS score in [16.5, 40.5] and not within 3km of any other ever proposed NPL sites (weighted by the number of 
                    owner-occupied housing units). 
Panel A:  Dependent variable  Log Price of owner-occupied housing units             
Percentile  10  20 30 40 50 60 70  80  90 










(0.148)  (0.115) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.115) (0.116)  (0.120)  (0.132) 
  Listing  0.030  0.054 0.051 0.046 0.030 0.001 -0.006  -0.018  -0.065 
(0.078)  (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052)  (0.054)  (0.068) 






* 0.098 0.086  0.034 
(0.094)  (0.069) (0.067) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.080) 
R-sqr  0.307  0.360 0.347 0.366 0.365 0.364 0.369  0.375  0.332 
Panel B:  Dependent variable  Price Level of owner-occupied housing units 
Percentile  10  20 30 40 50 60 70  80  90 










(5,712)  (5,778) (6,152) (6,785) (8,184) (9,001) (10,270)  (11,350)  (13,669) 
  Listing  2,034  3,546 3,595 3,478 2,270 939  1,374  27  -6,982 
(2,556)  (2,551) (2,681) (2,888) (2,987) (3,438) (3,865)  (4,319)  (6,364) 





** 7,724  10,511
* 10,605  3,456 
(3,408)  (3,510) (3,762) (4,097) (4,371) (4,919) (6,169)  (6,821)  (8,662) 
R-sqr  0.269  0.294 0.292 0.291 0.275 0.259 0.320  0.304  0.226 
Notes: Control variables are listed in Table 3(b).  818 observations.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at the 1% level, 
** 5% level and 
* 10% level. 50 
 
 
Table 7   –   Panel Analysis (1990-2000) of the RD sample, i.e., all tracts within 3km buffer of the 221 NPL sites
                    with 1982 HRS score in [16.5, 40.5]  (weighted by the number of owner-occupied housing units). 
Panel A:  Dependent variable  Log Price of owner-occupied housing units          
Percentile  10 20 30  40 50 60 70  80  90 
 Proposal  0.037 0.004 0.011  -0.002  -0.014  -0.021  -0.034  -0.036  -0.033 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.036)  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.034) 





*  0.069  0.067 0.058 0.026 
(0.046) (0.043) (0.044)  (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)  (0.042)  (0.041) 










(0.051) (0.047) (0.047)  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046)  (0.044)  (0.044) 
R-sqr  0.252 0.291 0.284  0.294 0.293 0.290 0.293  0.301  0.277 
Panel B:  Dependent variable  Price of owner-occupied housing units 
Percentile  10 20 30  40 50 60 70  80  90 






(3,177) (3,661) (2,450)  (2,695) (2,951) (3,339) (4,824)  (5,198)  (5,705) 
 Listing  5,066
***  3,233 3,149  2,187 1,331 256  -1,425  -2,524  -7,987* 
(1,853) (2,102) (2,210)  (2,414) (2,598) (2,826) (3,314)  (3,484)  (4,334) 









(2,207) (2,487) (2,492)  (2,708) (2,934) (3,168) (3,715)  (3,963)  (4,902) 
R-sqr  0.213 0.237 0.247  0.249 0.240 0.231 0.251  0.244  0.204 
Notes: Control variables are listed in Table 3(b).  1454 observations.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at the 1% level, 






Table 8(a) – Panel Analysis (1990-2000) of the Strict RD and RD Tract Samples (Alternative Specifications)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable for all columns:         Δ Log Price of owner-occupied housing units
Sample Strict RD  RD Strict RD RD
Weights No NoY e s Yes
Std Error Robust Robust Robust & Clustered on County Robust & Clustered on County








** 0.004 -0.014 -0.036
(0.139) (0.118) (0.125) (0.040) (0.038) (0.034) (0.165)  (0.165) (0.170) (0.077) (0.073) (0.069)
Listing  0.103  0.061  0.021 0.191
*** 0.102
** 0.120
*** 0.054  0.030 -0.018 0.112 0.075 0.058










(0.079) (0.070) (0.074) (0.054) (0.047) (0.046) (0.123)  (0.121) (0.123) (0.106) (0.105) (0.095)
R-sqr 0.256  0.310  0.322 0.206 0.245 0.258 0.360  0.365 0.375 0.291 0.293 0.301
Obs. 818  818  818 1454 1454 1454 818  818 818 1454 1454 1454
Notes. Control variables are listed in Table 3(b).  
*** significant at the 1% level, 
** 5% level and 
* 10% level.52 
 
  
Table 8(b) – Panel Analysis (1990-2000) for Tracts Within 5km Buffer
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)
Dependent variable: log price of owner-occupied housing units
Sample Strict RD RD














(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)




(0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Obs. 1131 1131 1131 2674  2674 2674
R-sqr 0.371 0.359 0.357 0.271  0.253 0.286
Notes: Control variables are listed in Table 3(b).  Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** significant at the 1% level, 
** 5% level and 




Table 8(c) –  Panel Analysis (1990-2000) of the All-NPL Tract Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable:   Log price of owner-occupied housing units
Weights Yes No  








(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
 Listing -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.016 -0.015 -0.020
*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
 Deletion 0.014 0.031
* 0.034
* -0.013 0.021 0.031
*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Obs.  9674 9674 9674 9674 9674 9674
R-sqr  0.228 0.243 0.245 0.134  0.175 0.179
Notes: Control variables are listed in Table 3(b).  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** significant at the 1% level, 
** 5% level and 




   Table 9  – Tracts in the strict RD sample that experienced non-zero change in 
                  exposure to proposed sites. 
NPL Site  Site Status  Date  Tract  Share of Tract
       Exposed  to 
            Proposed Sites
COD007063530 Discovery  3/1/1978  08031000202 0.47
  Proposal to NPL  5/10/1993  08031001101 0.30
  Cost Recovery  6/27/2006      
  Bankruptcy Settlement  3/13/2009       
MED980504393 Discovery  12/1/1979  23031005100 -0.37
  Proposal to NPL  6/24/1988  23031005200 -0.09
  Final listing on NPL  2/21/1990  23031005300 -0.30
     23031025100 -0.01
ORD009051442 Discovery  7/1/1979  41051003100 -0.01
  Proposal to NPL  1/22/1987  41051003200 -0.16
  Final listing on NPL  2/21/1990  41051003301 -0.60
 Deletion  11/14/1994 41051003401 -0.51
     41051003501 -0.14
     41051003601 -1.00
     41051003602 -0.94
     41051003603 -0.18
     41051003702 -1.00
     41051003802 -1.00
     41051003803 -0.84
PAD980692487 Discovery  6/1/1980  42039110600 -0.12
  Proposal to NPL  6/24/1988  42039110700 -0.18








Table 10: Block-Level Panel Analysis (1990-2000): Summary of Marginal Effects of Remedial Actions,  Strict RD Sample  
  
     (1)            (2)     (3)     (4)           (5)           (6)      (7)            (8) 
Counts by  Distance below a cutoff        Distance Bands 
EPA action  0.25km     0.5km    1km     3km    0-1km     1-2km    2-3km    3-5km   







(-0.203) (0.187) (0.096) (0.030) (0.095)  (0.050) (0.039) (0.042)






(0.139) (0.085) (0.047) (0.018) (0.047)  (0.030) (0.024) (0.029)







   (0.248)     (0.100)    (0.054)    (0.020)    (0.054)     (0.033)    (0.027)    (0.031)   
Notes: Obs=26,035. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** significant at the 1% level, 
** 5% level and 













Table 11: Block-Level Panel Analysis (1990-2000): Summary of Marginal Effects of Remedial Actions,  RD Sample  
  
     (1)             (2)          (3)       (4)         (5)           (6)         (7)           (8) 
Counts by  Distance below a cutoff        Distance Bands 
EPA action   0.25km     0.5km   1km     3km    0-1km     1-2km   2-3km    3-5km   





(0.254) (0.072) (0.032) (0.010) (0.032)  (0.018) (0.012) (0.013)







(0.069) (0.040) (0.021) (0.008) (0.021)  (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)







   (0.116)     (0.050)    (0.027)    (0.010)    (0.027)     (0.016)    (0.012)    (0.013)   
Notes: Obs=49,044. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** significant at the 1% level, 
** 5% level and 







Table 12: Block-Level Panel Analysis (1990-2000): Summary of Marginal Effects of Remedial Actions,  All-NPL Sample  
  
     (1)             (2)          (3)       (4)         (5)           (6)         (7)           (8) 
Counts by  Distance below a cutoff        Distance Bands 
EPA action   0.25km     0.5km   1km     3km    0-1km     1-2km   2-3km    3-5km   
Proposal 0.011  -0.010 -0.020
** -0.006
** -0.013 -0.005 -0.002 0.014
***










(0.033) (0.016) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)








   (0.066)     (0.025)    (0.011)    (0.003)    (0.011)     (0.006)    (0.005)    (0.005)   
Notes: Obs=323,682. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** significant at the 1% level, 
** 5% level and 
* 10% level. 58 
 
 
Table 13(a) – House-Level Analysis 
Marginal Effect of Sites Within 3km Buffer 
 
 
  Northern New Jersey  Los Angeles Metropolitan Area 






































  (0.030) (0.010) (0.013) (0.006) (0.016) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
          
Tract-by-Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes No  No Yes Yes No  No 
House  Fixed  Effects  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** significant at the 1% level, 
** 5% level and 
* 10% level.  Note that columns (3) and (4) do contain year fixed effects to 
flexibly control for trends in housing prices at the market level. 
 
 




Table 13(b) – House-Level Analysis 
Marginal Effect of Sites Within 3km Buffer 
 
 
  Boston Metropolitan Area  Southwestern Connecticut 





*** 0.014  0.011 -0.274
*** -0.327
*** 













*** 0.018  0.001 -0.350
*** -0.217
*** 









  (0.031) (0.011) (0.017) (0.006) (0.036) (0.025) (0.016) (0.022) 
          
Tract-by-Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes No  No Yes Yes No  No 
House  Fixed  Effects  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** significant at the 1% level, 
** 5% level and 
* 10% level.  Note that columns (3) and (4) do contain year fixed effects to 














Figure 1 – All-NPL Sites Progress Through Superfund Milestones
36 
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36 R=Removed from the NPL;  P=Proposed;   L=Listing;   D=Deletion.  The All-NPL samples also include 257 other sites were either (i) proposed to the NPL after 
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38 Note that 6 sites were proposed to the NPL and removed from the NPL before 1990.  R=Removed from the NPL;  P=Proposed;   L=Listing;   D=Deletion. 
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Figure 4 – Exposure to NPL Sites by Within-Tract Price 





























        Year    
# Categories    1990  2000 
1   <$15  <10 
2   $15-20  $10-15 
3   $20-25  $15-20 
4   $25-30  $20-25 
5   $30-35  $25-30 
6   $35-40  $30-35 
7   $40-45  $35-40 
8   $45-50  $40-50 
9   $50-60  $50-60 
10   $60-75  $60-70 
11   $75-100  $70-80 
12   $100-125  $80-90 
13   $125-150  $90-100 
14   $150-175  $100-125 
15   $175-200  $125-150 
16   $200-250  $150-175 
17   $250-300  $175-200 
18   $300-400  $200-250 
19   $400-500  $250-300 
20   >$500  $300-400 
21     $400-500 
22     $500-750 
23     $750-1mil 
24     >$1mil 
Notes: Values are in thousands of dollars 65 
 
Appendix A2: Construction of variables: Exposure to Deletion, Listing and Proposal 
 
In this appendix, we describe the construction of the tract-level variable measuring the 
exposure of tracts to NPL sites at the three milestones of proposal, listing, and deletion.  The 
following two maps show the NPL sites in the Memphis Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in 
1990 and 2000, respectively.  
 
Deletion 
Consider tract A which is completely enclosed within the 3km buffer of North 
Hollywood Dump.  North Hollywood Dump was in the listing stage in 1990 but reached the 
deleted stage by 2000.  The exposure of tract A to deleted sites in 1990 is zero and the exposure 
of tract A to deleted sites in 2000 is the share of that tract which overlaps with the 3km buffer 
surrounding North Hollywood Dump.  Because tract A is completely enclosed in the 3km buffer 
of North Hollywood Dump, this exposure amounts to 1.  A comparison of the two maps indicates 
that the change in exposure of tract A to deleted sites between 1990 and 2000 is also 1. 
Consider tract B which overlaps with a large segment of the 3km buffer surrounding 
Gallaway Pits.  Gallaway Pits was in the listing stage in 1990 and in the deleted stage in 2000.  
The exposure of tract B to deleted sites is zero in 1990, but in 2000 it is the share of that tract 
which overlaps with the 3km buffer surrounding Gallaway Pits.  
Finally, consider tract C which overlaps with the 3km buffer surrounding Chemet (a site 
that appears in 2000).  The exposure of tract C to deleted sites is zero in 1990, but in 2000 it is 
the share of that tract which overlaps with the 3km buffer surrounding Chemet. 
 
Listing 
Consider the exposure of tract A to listed sites in 1990. The exposure of tract A to listed 
sites in 1990 is the share of tract A that overlaps with North Hollywood Dump (i.e., 1), and its 
exposure to listed sites in 2000 is zero.  Therefore, the change in exposure of tract A between 
1990 and 2000 to listed sites is -1.  
Consider tract D which overlaps with Gurley Pit.  Gurley Pit is in the listing stage in both 
1990 and 2000.  The exposure of tract D to listed sites in 1990 is the share of the tract that 
overlaps with Gurley Pit.  That exposure in 2000 is the same.  Therefore, the change in exposure 
of tract D to listed sites between 1990 and 2000 is zero. 66 
 
Proposal 
Consider tract E which overlaps with Carrier Air Conditioning Company. The Carrier site 
is in the proposal stage in 1990 and in the listing stage in 2000.  The exposure of tract E to 
proposed sites in 1990 is therefore the share of the tract that overlaps with Carrier, and exposure 
to proposed sites in 2000 is zero.  The change in exposure of tract E to proposed sites between 
1990 and 2000 is then the negative of the share of tract land exposed in 1990. 
 
Overlap  
Consider the case where the 3km buffer of two NPL sites with the same status at time t 
overlap, and this overlapping area is enclosed in a tract.  In calculating the exposure of the tract 
to those two NPL sites, we include the overlap area only once in our calculation of exposure. 
This is one extreme option in defining exposure, which maintains the exposure of the tract is 
always at or below one.  The drawback of this approach is that we do not account for the 
possibility that exposure to two deleted sites may have stronger effects on the appreciation of 
housing values than the exposure to one deleted site.  Nevertheless, as seen in Table A2.1, in our 
(preferred) strict RD sample of tracts, very few tracts intersect with areas of overlap between two 
or more NPL sites. Specifically, only 5 and 12 tracts intersect with areas of overlap of sites that 
are deleted or listed, respectively. 
At the other extreme of defining exposure, we could include the overlap area twice in our 
calculation, resulting in some cases of exposure of the tract exceeding one.  It is not clear, 
however, that the marginal effect of multiple exposures to sites at the same level of remediation 
should not be decreasing.  In any case, the assumption we make about multiple exposures should 











Table A2.1:  Tracts in the Strict RD where buffers of two NPL 
                     sites with the same status overlap 
Tract-ID 
  Share of tract 
 
exposed to the 
overlap 
Panel A: Deleted sites (5 out of 1666 tracts x years) 
10003016000   39.8 
42069112500   14.2 
42069112600   88.5 
42069112700   99.3 
42069112800   8.1 
Panel B: Listed sites (12 out of 1666 tracts x years) 
18061060600   0.5 
21029021200   0.3 
21093000100   33.5 
21093000200   1.1 
21111012104   10.0 
21139040200   3.3 
21157950100   15.7 
34021004203   1.8 
36063022900   4.9 
42101032200   47.4 
42069112500   10.6 
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Appendix A3: Comparison with Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) 
  The differences between our study and Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) are summarized 
in Table A3.1. These differences include: (i) our focus on deletion as the milestone used to 
measure of benefits from cleanup, (ii) the construction of our data (i.e., tracts as our observation 
units, our sample of ever proposed NPL sites, our definition of exposure to NPL sites, and our 
use of smaller buffers to define neighborhoods affected by NPL sites); and (iii) our method (i.e., 
measuring the effects of deletion separately from listing, applying a panel method to the RD 
sample and examining the lower quantiles of tract-level housing values).  
 
Comparison of our regression model with Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) 
 
As described in section 4.1, we begin with the standard hedonic specification that relates 
tract or block housing values with contemporaneous tract or block attributes, and then difference 
across the 2000 and 1990 specifications in order to control for time invariant unobservables at 
the tract or block level.  In contrast, Greenstone and Gallagher’s regression model relates 2000 
tract median housing values to 1980 tract characteristics and 1980 tract median values; they 
argue that 1980 tract attributes are correlated with the 2000 attributes, but are pre-determined 
with respect to Superfund site status.  Deriving the Greenstone and Gallagher regression 
specification from 1990 and 2000 hedonic price functions, however, we find that the resulting 
regression error will be correlated with the key variables appearing on the right-hand-side of the 




                                     1            1            
            
 
                                            1            1           
            
 
Noting that           0 , we can multiply the second equation by   and then difference these 
two equations to obtain: 
 
                                  1            1                                                  
 
In order to convert this into the equation estimated by Greenstone and Gallagher, we need to (i) 
add         to both sides of the equation, and (ii) move       
    into the regression error term: 
 
             1            1           
                           




39 For this illustration, we use Greenstone and Gallagher’s notation, where        refers to the median housing value 
in census tract c in year 2000, 1           1   is an indicator taking the value 1 if that tract was exposed to either 
a listed or deleted site in that year, and       
   is a vector of tract attributes). 71 
 
 
where       .  Note that the resulting regression error ( ) will contain the unobserved 
determinants of the 1980 median house value (        , so that the 1980 median (or mean) 
housing value will naturally be correlated with it, based on the original hedonic specification.  
Because year 2000 covariates are relegated to the regression error, 1980 covariates (        will 
likely be correlated with this component of the error term as well.  Finally, the main variable of 
interest (year 2000 NPL status) will be correlated with the regression error term if it is correlated 
with year 2000 covariates, which we might also suspect to be the case.  Greenstone and 
Gallagher will therefore need to rely on their regression discontinuity and IV approaches to 
eliminate any bias stemming from this correlation. 
 
Direct comparison of our method with Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) 
We next provide a direct comparison of our method with Greenstone and Gallagher 
(2008), to the extent possible given the limitations posed by our different samples and methods.  
We can replicate most closely their RD specification which relates sites’ statuses to tract 
attributes on which these sites are located.  We begin by constructing an “intersection” sample 
(i.e., the intersection of our data set and Greenstone and Gallagher’s).  We continue to restrict 
our sample to those sites that are ever proposed to the NPL.  We exclude non-NPL sites because 
including these sites amongst the “non-treatment” observations can lead to a downward bias in 
the estimates of benefits from deletion.  Therefore, a key difference between the samples is that 
Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) include 65 non-NPL sites in their analysis of 227 sites, while 
we exclude non-NPL sites from our “intersection” sample. 
The unit of observation in our main analysis is the tract, while Greenstone and 
Gallagher’s unit of observation is the site.  To be comparable with their analysis, we therefore 
limit our intersection sample to include only tracts on which no more than one site is located.  
For their covariates, Greenstone and Gallagher use tract attributes on which these sites are 
located or the weighted average of values for tracts that intersect within their 3 mile buffers 
around the sites.  In doing so, Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) assume that exposure to the sites 
is homogeneous across the housing distribution within the tract (i.e., the weighted average does 
not allow for covariates to vary systematically within tracts).  Table A3.2 describes the steps in 
constructing our “intersection” sample and our variables.  
 First, we apply Greenstone and Gallagher’s (2008) method – i.e., the use of 
[HRS82>28.5] to define an instrument for listing on the NPL by 2000 ([NPL2000=1]) – to the 
“intersection” sample.  We find two problems with this IV approach.  First, the instrument is 
weak in the “intersection” sample; second, this single instrument cannot simultaneously address 
two endogenous variables (i.e., listing and deletion).  Listing and deletion are distinct Superfund 
treatments that should be measured separately; listing has ambiguous effects on housing prices, 
while deletion is likely to raise housing prices. Table A3.3 shows the first-stage relationship used 72 
 
in the IV strategy, regressing the [NPL2000=1] indicator on the instrument and the other 
exogenous variables.  The relationship between the instrument and endogenous variable exhibits 
insufficient statistical significance (i.e., a t-statistic of only 2.38) to avoid the “weak instruments” 
problem. (Staiger and Stock, 1997).  A weak instrument contributes to imprecise measurement 
and results that are sensitive to the specification. 
We run regressions with housing prices at the qth decile as the dependent variable, using 
[HRS82>28.5] as an instrument for [NPL2000=1], and employing the other 1980 control variables 
as in Greenstone and Gallagher.
40  Our analysis compares exposure to listing (i.e., which 
includes all sites that have been exposed to either listed or deleted sites as of 2000) relative to 
exposure to pre-proposed or proposed sites, while Greenstone and Gallagher’s analysis compares 
the effect of listing (similarly defined) relative to the pre-proposal or proposal stages of NPL 
sites or non-NPL sites. The regressions shown in our Table A3.4 (first row) correspond to 
Greenstone and Gallagher’s results described in their Table IV (Panel A, seventh column).  Our 
coefficient at the median, shown in the third column, is similar to theirs.  In particular, we find a 
positive (0.403) but statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.612) effect of NPL2000 treatment at the 
median.  This insignificant point estimate is slightly larger than that estimated by Greenstone and 
Gallagher.  This difference may arise from our exclusion but their inclusion of non-NPL sites as 
“non-treatment” sites; the latter leads to a downward bias in the estimate of benefits.   
Next we examine how these results vary across the housing value distribution.  In Table 
A3.4 (first row), reading across the columns, we see the effects of [NPL2000=1] at different 
deciles of the housing value distribution, as estimated by regressions at the respective deciles.  
While none of the effects are statistically significant, we do find large, positive point estimates at 
the lower deciles.  Unsurprisingly, given the presence of weak instruments, these results are 
highly sensitive to model specification.  The second row shows results when state fixed effects 
are dropped from each specification.  The wide fluctuations in point estimates associated with 
[NPL2000=1] is indicative of a weak instruments problem. 
We next apply our method to this intersection sample.  Our panel approach allows us to 
measure separately the effects of listing and deletion, while controlling for time invariant 
unobservables that are correlated with both listing and deletion.  Time-varying unobservables 
can still bias our results on listing and deletion, but the bias is likely to be limited.  First, any 
such bias on the listing coefficient is mitigated by using the RD sample (i.e., sites that are 
proposed but not listed should be similar to sites that are listed).  Second, Sigman (2001) 




40 Our 1980 covariates, listed in Table A3.3, correspond to those used in Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) with one 
exception – we were unable to include the percentage of households with air conditioning in our list.  
41 See the discussion in section 6.1.   
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We apply our method in three progressive steps.  (i) We introduce the panel approach, 
but continue to measure exposure using a single treatment variable – i.e., listed on or deleted 
from the NPL in 2000 (NPL2000) and listed on or deleted from the NPL in 1990 (NPL1990).  (ii) 
We move from the single treatment measure to two separate treatment measures – i.e., exposure 
of the tract to listed sites and exposure of the tract to deleted sites in each year.  Thus, we 
examine the changes in exposure to listing (listed2000-1990) and changes in exposure to deletion 
(deletion2000-1990).  (iii) We examine not only the median, but also the upper and lower quantiles 
of the tract-level housing value distribution.  In all three steps, the 1980 covariates appear in the 
differenced regression specification as we allow their coefficients to vary over time.  
The panel model using exposure measured with a single “listed on the NPL” variable 
continues to yield statistically insignificant coefficients, as seen in the third row of Table A3.4. 
These insignificant results are unsurprising, as this specification continues to conflate listing and 
deletion into a single variable.  Our final specification considers the two exposure variables 
(listing and deletion) separately in combination with looking at the full distribution of housing 
values within tract.  The regression yields coefficients of 0.13 and 0.126 at the 10
th and 20
th 
percentile respectively – these results are nearly statistically significant at conventional levels 
with p-values of 0.11 and 0.114, respectively (note the small size of the intersection sample that 
we use for this exercise; N = 158).  There is, however, no statistically significant effect at or 
above the 30
th percentile.  We therefore find evidence of greater appreciation from deletion at 
lower quantiles (albeit at smaller magnitudes), but no such evidence at the upper quantiles.  
These results are comparable to our main results (i.e., when we apply our method to our strict 
RD and RD samples).  Nevertheless, the magnitudes of appreciation in the lower deciles are 
smaller in our “intersection” sample than in our main strict RD and RD samples.  
 




Table A3.1:  Comparison With Greenstone and Gallagher (2008); Data and Methods 
 This Study                          GG (2008) 
Research  The effect of Deletion (signalling the The effect of Listing (an intermediate milestone 
Question  end of cleanup) on housing values in the Superfund process) on housing values
Data 
Sites in  221 sites  227 sites 
Regression Begin with 1722 sites that are ever proposed  Begin with 676 sites that were scored
Discontinuity      to the NPL by Jan 1, 2010 (i.e. NPL sites).     in 1982.
(RD) sample  Restrict to 221 sites that received  Restrict to 332 sites that received 
    16.5 HRS-82  40.5.     16.5 HRS-82  40.5. 
[95 out of 332  sites dropped due to 
     missing 1980 variables.]
Excluded  Excludes non-NPL sites. Includes non-NPL sites.
sites  (Non-NPL=not proposed to NPL by 1/1/2010)
   Rationale for excluding non-NPL sites:  [65 out of 227 sites are non-NPL sites]
Tracts hosting NPL and non-NPL sites are
likely to differ systematically, violating
the spirit of the RD design.
The strict RD sample (187 sites) further
exclude tracts exposed to sites for which
(i) HRS-82 < 16.5 &  HRS-82 > 40.5 or
or (ii) unscored in 1982, as these sites
may confound housing prices.
 
Unit of Tracts Sites
observation  i.e. whose centroids fall within the Housing and demographic attributes from
buffer around the sites.  (i) tracts on which sites are located, or
(ii) average attribute of tracts that overlap with 
  the buffer around the site, thus assuming 
within tract homogeneity.
Affected  Buffer of 3km ( 2 miles) Buffer of 3 miles
neighborhood  and 5 km (   3 miles). and 5 miles.
Rationale: Distance-based studies find
hazardous waste sites are associated 
with depreciation in housing values
within  3km of the site. 
Exposure  Share of tract that overlap with  Binary indicator :
measure buffers surrounding NPL sites 1= site is "Listed" by 2000, 0= site "Non-listed".
i.e. whether Proposed, Listed, or "Listed" includes Listed, Construction Complete, 




Table A3.1 (continued): Comparison of this study and GG (2008) RD-tract-level analysis in their Data and Method
Estimation Method 
Superfund  Measure the effects of Proposed, Measure the effect of "Listed" vs. "Non-listed".
milestones Listed, and Deleted relative to "Listed"=Listed or beyond the Listed milestone.
examined Pre-proposal as the omitted category. "Non-listed"=Proposed or pre-proposed to NPL
Rationale - these milestones are likely to    and non-NPL.
have distinct effects of housing values.  
Housing values Entire house price distribution Median tract-level housing values.
examined at the tract level.
Further analysis uses median block-level
housing values.
Estimation Sample restrictions to RD and strict RD Sample restrictions to RD sample.
Strategy samples. 
Panel analysis (1990-2000).  IV for "Listed"/Non-listed" on the NPL
using HRS-82.
Rationale: IV using HRS-82 cannot be IV using HRS-82 can be applied to
applied to three variables - Proposed,  to the one variable "Listed/Non-Listed"







Table A3.2:  Steps in creating a sample defined as closely as possible to GG's RD sample 
 Greenstone and Gallagher (2008)   Our study
Sample Start with 687 sites scored in 1982. Start with 1722 sites ever proposed to NPL by 1/1/2010.
Restrict to 332 sites that received Restrict to 221 sites that received 
 16.5 HRS-82 40.5.   16.5 HRS-82 40.5.
Units of Sites.  Our study has used tracts as units of observation.
Obs.  The attributes related to the sites are from
tracts on which the sites are located.
   GG is able to include 3 pair of sites In which each For comparability with GG's sample, we restrict our sample
pair occupies the same tract. E.g. a tract has to 221 tracts occupied by sites. We further restrict our sample 
site A that is listed and site B that is proposed. to 215 tracts occupied by no more than one site per tract 
The tract attributes enters as two rows of data because can define HRS-82, used as the IV, for such
   corresponding to site A and site B, respectively. tracts only.
Final  Only 227 sites with 1980 covariates   Only 158 tracts with 1980 covariates 
sample      - 65 non-NPL sites in sample   - no NPL sites in sample
Treatment  NPL2000=1 if site Listed and 0 if site unlisted. NPL2000=1 for tracts exposed to listed or deleted sites
definition Listed=Listed or beyond the listing milestone.                             in 2000.
Not-Listed=NPL site that is pre-proposed or NPL2000=0 for tracts exposed to NPL sites proposed
or proposed and non-NPL sites.                    in 2000 or still pre-proposed in 2000.77 
 
Table A3.3 –  First-Stage Regression, Greenstone and Gallagher IV Procedure 
(State Fixed Effects Included).  Dependent Variable = NPL2000,         
N = 158, R
2 = 0.506. 
 
Notes: State fixed effects are included. Mean NPL2000=  0.981       * 
statistically significant at the 10% and   ** statistically significant at 5%.
Mean  Std 
1980-covariates in 1980 Coefficient Error t-stat
1[HRS-82>28.5] 0.85 0.081 ** 0.034 2.38
% unit occupied 94 0.002 0.004 0.57
% owner occupied 71 0.002 * 0.001 1.66
Housing unit density 0.0002 -133.4 329.5 -0.40
Population density 0.0004 54.7 124.2 0.44
% Black 9 -0.001 0.001 -0.83
% Hispanic 3 0.005 0.004 1.14
% under 18 years old 29 0.0008 0.004 0.21
% high school dropout 36 -0.007 ** 0.003 -2.64
% college educated 13 -0.003 0.003 -0.97
% below poverty line 11 -0.005 0.004 -1.45
% public assistance 8 0.006 0.004 1.37
% female headed HH 17 0.001 0.003 0.44
Mean HH income $20,141 -1.2 x10
-5 * -6.2 x10
-6 -1.97
% attached homes 3 0.001 0.002 0.57
% mobile homes 7 -0.0009 0.002 -0.48
% 0-2 bedrooms 33 -0.003 0.004 -0.78
% 3-4 bedrooms 63 -0.003 0.004 -0.88
% units built within 5 years 13 9.3 x10
-4 0.003 0.31
% units built within 10 years 25 -0.003 0.002 -1.30
% same house in the last 5 years 57 -0.002 0.002 -1.40
Mean housing value $60,469 1.0 x10
-6 1.0 x10
-6 1.03
Constant 1 1.561 ** 0.598 2.6178 
 
 
Table A3.4 – Comparison with Greenstone and Gallagher (2008); Results. 
 
Notes: All specifications include 1980 covariates correspond to those listed in Table 3(b).  158 observations.  
†p-value=0.110  and 
§p-value=0.114. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] State
Panel Method  Dependent Variable Percentile Fixed
   Variable of Interest 10 20 50 80  90  Effects
A  2SLS  Log Price 2000  NPL 2000 1.489 0.728 0.403 0.492  0.204 Y
  mean=0.981 (1.250) (1.002) (0.794) (0.895) (0.964)
B 2SLS  Log Price 2000  NPL 2000 0.032 -0.401 -0.310 -0.149 -0.486 N
  mean=0.981 (0.985) (0.885) (0.773) (0.839) (0.895)
C  Panel OLS Log Price NPL -0.108 -0.033 -0.124 -0.106 -0.169 Y
1990-2000   mean=0.019 (0.169) (0.153) (0.117) (0.109) (0.127)
D  Panel OLS Log Price Listing 0.083 0.050 -0.044 0.030  0.043 Y
1990-2000   mean=-0.095 (0.086) (0.078) (0.060) (0.056) (0.066)
Deletion 0.130
† 0.126
§ -0.010 0.026  0.036
mean=0.190 (0.081) (0.073) (0.057) (0.053) (0.062)